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How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Can
lawmakers be trusted to police themselves? This Article examines
Congress’s capacity and incentives to enforce upon itself “the law of
congressional lawmaking”—a largely overlooked body of law that is
completely insulated from judicial enforcement. The Article explores
the political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage in
self-policing and rule-following behavior. It identifies the major
political safeguards that can be garnered from the relevant legal,
political science, political economy, and social psychology scholar-
ship, and evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination of
theoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. The
Article’s main argument is that the political safeguards that scholars
and judges commonly rely upon to constrain legislative behavior
actually motivate lawmakers to be lawbreakers. 
In addition to providing insights about Congress’s behavior in the
absence of judicial review, this Article’s examination contributes to
the debate about judicial review of the legislative process, the general
debate on whether political safeguards reduce the need for judicial
review, and the burgeoning new scholarship about legislative rules.
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INTRODUCTION
How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Can
lawmakers be trusted to police themselves? When it comes to “the
law of congressional lawmaking”—the constitutional, statutory, and
internal rules that govern Congress’s legislative process1—this
question is not merely theoretical. Federal courts have consistently
refused to enforce this body of law,2 leaving its enforcement entirely
to Congress.3 This largely overlooked area of law is therefore a
useful laboratory for evaluating Congress’s behavior in the absence
of judicial review. 
This Article examines whether Congress has the capacity and
incentives to enforce upon itself the law of congressional lawmaking.
It explores the major “political safeguards”4 that can be garnered
from the legal, political science, political economy, and social
psychology scholarship about self policing and rule following. It then
evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination of theoreti-
cal, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. This Article’s
main argument is that the political safeguards that scholars and
judges commonly rely upon to constrain legislative behavior actually
have the opposite effect: these “safeguards” in fact motivate law-
makers to be lawbreakers. 
1. For an overview of the rules that govern Congress’s legislative process, see infra Part
I.A.
2. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of
Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. OneSimpleLoan v. Spellings,
552 U.S. 1180 (2008); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1076 (2007); Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
3. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the
Enrolled Bill Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 373 (2009) (stating that Field v. Clark’s enrolled bill
doctrine “effectively insulates the legislative process from judicial review and, consequently,
establishes Congress’s unfettered power to control this process”); see also Stanley Bach, The
Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 731 (1989) (“No outside force compels
Congress to abide by its rules. If these rules are enforced rigorously and consistently, it is only
because Congress chooses to do so.”); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules
and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 526 (2009) (“[A]t present, legislative
rules rely wholly upon internal enforcement by Congress.”).
4. This phrase was famously coined in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954).
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This Article also explores Congress’s capacity to enforce upon
itself the law of congressional lawmaking by examining Congress’s
enforcement mechanisms and presenting three cases that demon-
strate the circumstances under which these mechanisms can fail.
The Article argues that congressional enforcement is fallible both in
terms of lawmakers’ capacity to police themselves and in terms of
their incentives to do so.
This examination has crucial importance for at least three areas
of legal scholarship. The first is the debate about judicial review of
the legislative process. The question of whether courts should
enforce the rules governing lawmaking and other principles of “due
process of lawmaking” is “currently the subject of vigorous debate
... in the scholarly literature.”5 One of the prominent objections to
judicial enforcement is “the argument that judicial review of the
enactment process is not needed because Congress (coupled with the
inherent check of the presidential veto power) can be relied upon to
police itself.”6 Indeed, opponents of judicial oversight claim that
Congress has “adequate incentives” and “numerous, effective
techniques” to enforce compliance with the law of lawmaking.7 This
assumption is also at least partly responsible for the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to enforce this body of law.8 In some states, this
assumption even contributed to the enactment of constitutional
amendments barring judicial review of the legislative process.9
Hence, although this Article expresses no opinion on other argu-
5. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 465 (2003).
6. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 331.
7. Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J.
1457, 1505-07 (2005).
8. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 403-04 & n.2 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that courts should not enforce Article I, Section 7’s Origination Clause
because the House can be relied upon to protect its origination power); see also infra Part
III.E; cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1982) (assuming that because Congress’s
enrollment procedure involves the committees on enrolled bills, the presiding officers and the
clerks of the two houses, and the President, this constitutes a sufficient institutional check
against enactment of legislation in violation of constitutional lawmaking requirements).
9. See, e.g., Geja’s Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill.
1992) (suggesting that the framers of Illinois’s 1970 Constitution “enacted the enrolled bill
doctrine on the assumption that the General Assembly would police itself and judicial review
would not be needed because violations of the constitutionally required procedures would be
rare”).
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ments underlying the debate about judicial review of the legislative
process, by refuting the prevalent underlying assumption of judicial
review opponents, it contributes to a crucial aspect of this debate.
Second, this Article’s examination also contributes to the debate
about whether political safeguards can reduce or eliminate the need
for judicial review in other areas. Assumptions about political
safeguards and about Congress’s incentives and capacities have long
been influential in normative debates about federalism,10 and are
becoming increasingly influential in broader debates about judicial
review, judicial supremacy, and congressional constitutional inter-
pretation.11 This Article’s examination may be particularly helpful
to these debates,12 responding to the need for scholarship examining
areas of congressional activity that are “outside the [s]hadow [c]ast
by the [c]ourts.”13
Third, this Article’s examination is fundamental for the burgeon-
ing new scholarship about legislative rules. After many years of
largely neglecting the rules that govern the legislative process, legal
scholars are increasingly realizing that these rules “are at least as
important a determinant of policy outcomes and of the quality of
legislative deliberation as are electoral rules, substantive legislative
10. For an overview of this vast scholarship, see generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & John
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459
(2001). 
11. Examples of this burgeoning scholarship include Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be
Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures, in CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 293 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) [hereinafter Sinclair, Can
Congress Be Trusted?]; Mark Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives
and Institutional Design, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 355 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures]. For a recent overview of this debate, see generally
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525 (2009). Assumptions about
congressional capacity are also important in arguments against judicial intervention in other
areas of congressional activity. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of
Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1086, 1152-53 (2009) (arguing that legislative-executive
disputes over the contempt power should be nonjusticiable, in part because Congress has
sufficient tools to enforce compliance with its contempt findings); Josh Chafetz, Politician,
Police Thyself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A15 (making a similar argument in favor of
congressional, rather than legal, enforcement in the context of ethics rules).
12. With the caveat that political safeguards and legislators’ motivations may operate
somewhat differently in different areas of congressional activity. See infra Part IV.A.
13. Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria
and Two Informal Case Studies, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 269,
271-73.
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powers, and other subjects studied exhaustively by constitutional
lawyers.”14 Indeed, a flurry of recent scholarship lauds such rules as
a solution to a wide array of pathologies in the legislative process
and as a means to achieve procedural ideals as well as better
substantive outcomes.15 Given the lack of external enforcement,
however, it is essential to evaluate Congress’s capacity and incen-
tives to enforce these rules on its own in order to assess the viability
of these solutions.
Part I provides a brief overview of the rules that regulate the leg-
islative process. It then establishes the practical and normative
importance of these rules, integrating the insights of political scien-
tists, democratic theorists, legal philosophers, and social psycholo-
gists. Part II reveals the fallibility of congressional enforcement of
these rules by examining Congress’s enforcement mechanisms and
the circumstances under which they can fail.
Part III explores political safeguards and their projected impact
on congressional compliance with the law of congressional lawmak-
ing, arguing that these safeguards’ overall impact is in fact a moti-
vation to violate the rules. Although the Article refutes several
assumptions that are widely held by judges and scholars alike, it
does not go so far as to argue that Congress will never follow the
rules. Instead, Part IV offers some observations about the types of
rules that are more susceptible to violations and the circumstances
in which violations are more likely.
14. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 362 (2004). 
15. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can
a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 992 (2007) [hereinafter Bruhl, Judicial Confirmation
Process]; Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-
Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 962; Chad W. Dunn, Playing by the Rules:
The Need for Constitutions To Define the Boundaries of the Legislative Game with a One-
Subject Rule, 35 UWLA L. REV. 129, 131 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the
Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 687-88 (1999); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner,
Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 570-72 (2007); Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process
Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3, 15 (2009).
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I. THE LAW OF CONGRESSIONAL LAWMAKING 
A. The Rules Governing Lawmaking
The congressional legislative process is governed by a variety of
normative sources. The Constitution sets relatively sparse proce-
dural requirements for lawmaking,16 while authorizing each house
to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”17 The majority of the
rules that govern the congressional legislative process are therefore
enacted under this authority, either as statutory rules18 or as
standing rules by each chamber independently.19 These enacted
rules are complemented by the chambers’ formal precedents, which
“may be viewed as the [chambers’] ‘common law’ ... with much the
same force and binding effect,”20 and by established conventional
practices.21 
Although Congress may not alter the constitutional rules,22 both
chambers have procedures that allow for amendment of the
nonconstitutional rules, as well as procedures to waive or suspend
virtually any statutory or internal rule.23 Nevertheless, the
subconstitutional rules are also widely accepted as binding and
enforceable law, in the sense that they have “come to be recognized
as binding on the assembly and its members, except as it may be
16. For an overview of the constitutional rules that govern the legislative process, see
Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1145-50, 1172-81 (2003); Vermeule, supra note 14, at 386-427.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
18. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set Legislative Rules:
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345
(2003) [hereinafter Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules]; Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes
of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett,
Purposes of Framework Legislation].
19. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 3, at 524-26.
20. Max Reynolds, Note, The Impact of Congressional Rules on Appropriations Law, 12
J.L. & POL. 481, 487 (1996) (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, at vii (1977)).
21. See Bach, supra note 3, at 732-36.
22. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446 (1998) (“Congress cannot alter the
procedures set out in Article I, § 7, without amending the Constitution.”).
23. See Bach, supra note 3, at 737-39; Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules, supra note
18, at 363-65.
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varied by the adoption by the membership of special rules or
through some other authorized procedural device.”24 
This large body of constitutional, statutory, and internal rules
regulating the congressional lawmaking process can be described as
“the law of congressional lawmaking.” This Article focuses on a
particular part of this law: the constitutional and various subcon-
stitutional rules that set procedural restrictions on the legislative
process.25 
This includes rules that stipulate the procedural requirements
that must be satisfied for a bill to become law, such as the constitu-
tional bicameralism and presentment requirements,26 the constitu-
tional quorum requirement,27 and the subconstitutional requirement
that every bill receive three readings prior to passage.28 It addition-
ally includes rules that limit the pace of the legislative process, for
example the House rule prohibiting floor consideration of a bill
reported by a committee until the third calendar day after the
committee report on that bill becomes available to House mem-
bers.29 Also included are rules that set more specific limitations,
such as the constitutional rule that bills for raising revenue
originate in the House30 and the chamber rules that prohibit the
enactment of substantive law through appropriation bills.31 
All these rules impose restraints or create hurdles in the legis-
lative process, thereby constraining Congress’s ability to pass
24. WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE
RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 825 (2003); see also Reynolds, supra
note 20, at 487.
25. Hence, excluded from the present inquiry are rules that do not directly regulate the
process of enacting legislation, budgetary rules, and rules that facilitate and accelerate the
passage of legislation, such as “fast track” rules.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stipulating that for proposed legislation to become law,
the same bill must be passed by both houses of Congress and be signed by the President, or
repassed by a supermajority over the President’s veto); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1892).
28. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 111th CONG., R. XVI(8) (2009),  available
at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/rules111/111th.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE RULES]; STANDING
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, at R. XIV, cl. 2 (2000), available at http://rules.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXIV [hereinafter SENATE RULES].
29. HOUSE RULES, supra note 28, R. XIII(4)(a)(1). For other examples of rules that impose
delay in the legislative process, see Gersen & Posner, supra note 15, at 553-55.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394-95
(1990).
31. HOUSE RULES, supra note 28, R. XXI(2)(b); SENATE RULES, supra note 28, R. XVI.
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legislation.32 Nevertheless, neither courts nor any other external
body enforce any of these rules—whether constitutional, statutory,
or internal.33 These rules present, therefore, a particularly fascinat-
ing test case for Congress’s ability to police itself.
B. The Value of Lawmaking Rules
Legal scholarship has traditionally overlooked the rules that
govern the legislative process.34 In recent years, however, legal
scholars who heed the insights of political scientists are increasingly
realizing that these rules have “immense practical importance.”35 As
political scientist Gary Cox explains, “[r]ules can change the set of
bills that ... the legislature consider[s]; they can change the menu of
amendments to any given bill considered[;] ... they can affect how
members vote; and—putting the first three effects together—they
can affect which bills pass.”36 Indeed, a growing body of theoretical,
experimental, and empirical research by political scientists demon-
strates that legislative rules can significantly impact the policy
outcomes of the legislative process.37 
32. For somewhat different overviews on procedural rules that make passage of legislation
more difficult, see, for example, Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It:
Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1765 (2003)
(discussing “delay procedures that are intended to give passions time to cool down”); Garrett,
Purposes of Framework Legislation, supra note 18, at 748-49 (discussing statutory procedural
rules that are intentionally designed to make the passage of certain policies more difficult);
Gersen & Posner, supra note 15, at 548-55 (discussing, inter alia, “delay rules” that forestall
action in the legislative process).
33. To be sure, Munoz-Flores signaled the Court’s willingness to enforce at least one of
these rules—the Origination Clause—but later district and appellate court cases indicate that
federal courts will refuse to enforce even the constitutional rules. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra
note 3, at 352 (citing cases); see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
34. See Vermeule, supra note 14, at 363.
35. Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules, supra note 18, at 393; see also Vermeule,
supra note 14, at 362.
36. Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 169, 170 (2000). 
37. See BRYAN W. MARSHALL, RULES FOR WAR: PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE US HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 87-103, 120-23 (2005); Cox, supra note 36, at 169, 174-88; Karl-Martin
Ehrhart et al., Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 59 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 279, 293 (2007); Keith E. Hamm et al., Structuring Committee Decision-Making: Rules
and Procedures in US State Legislatures, 7 J. LEGIS. STUD. 13, 13 (2001) (“The rediscovery of
rules and procedures as an important element for understanding legislative decision-making
has become very apparent in recent summaries of research on Congress and European
Parliaments.”); Nathan W. Monroe & Gregory Robinson, Do Restrictive Rules Produce
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In addition to their crucial impact on legislative outcomes,
legislative procedures are also instrumental in ensuring the legit-
imacy of Congress and of the laws it produces. As proceduralist
democratic theorists point out, legislative procedures are an
especially important means to establish the legitimacy of law,
because, in the current reality of a “great deal of substantive moral
and ethical dissensus,” no normative substantive standard can
appropriately be used in justifying collective political choices.38 If,
however, “justification for the force of law can be found in the
generally accepted ... processes whence contested laws issue, then
no number of intractable disagreements over the substantive merits
of particular laws can threaten it.”39
Experimental and survey-based research by social psychologists
and political scientists confirms that public perceptions about
congressional procedure—particularly the belief that Congress
employs fair decision-making procedures in the legislative process
—significantly impact Congress’s legitimacy, as well as individual’s
willingness to obey the law.40 These studies show, moreover, that
although there are widespread differences in evaluations of the
Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st108th Congresses, 70 J. POL.
217, 228-29 (2008); Bjørn Erik Rasch, Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda
Setting in Europe, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 3, 4 (2000) (“Theoretical arguments as well as
experimental results support the view that decision-making procedures and the details of
legislative agendas to a large extent determine outcomes.”); Tim Westmoreland, Standard
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1557 (2007) (“To a large
extent, many legislative decisions are pre-ordained by their mode of congressional
consideration.... [T]he process is the policy.”).
38. Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: Tribe on
Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891, 892 (2007); see also David
Estlund, Democratic Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK FOR CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 208,
210-13 (Frank Jackson & Michael Smith eds., 2005); David Estlund, Introduction to
DEMOCRACY 1, 6-7 (David Estlund ed., 2002).
39. Michelman, supra note 38, at 892; see also José Luis Martí Mármol, The Sources of
Legitimacy of Political Decisions: Between Procedure and Substance, in THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION: ESSAYS IN LEGISPRUDENCE 259, 270-71 (Luc J. Wintgens ed.,
2005).
40. See, e.g., John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, The Means Is the End, in WHAT
IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 243, 243-45 (John R. Hibbing &
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001); Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations
of the Lawmaking Process, 25 POL. BEHAV. 119, 135 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid
Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28
L. & SOC’Y REV. 809, 827 (1994); Stacy G. Ulbig, Policies, Procedures, and People: Sources of
Support for Government?, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 789, 793-96 (2002).
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favorability or fairness of outcomes, “to a striking degree” there is
common agreement across ethnic, gender, education, income, age,
and ideological boundaries on the criteria that define fair decision-
making procedures, as well as widespread agreement that such
procedures are key to legitimacy.41
In addition to their practical and instrumental significance, the
importance of the rules that regulate the legislative process also
stems from their underlying democratic values and principles.42
These rules embody, and are designed to ensure, essential demo-
cratic principles, such as majority rule, transparency and publicity,
deliberation, procedural fairness, and participation.43 
Furthermore, the rules that regulate the legislative process are
an essential component of the rule of law. As Joseph Raz noted in
one of the most influential formulations of the “rule of law,” “[i]t is
one of the important principles of the doctrine that the making of
particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable
general rules.”44 The procedural rules that instruct lawmakers how
to exercise their lawmaking power play a vital role in ensuring that
“the slogan of the rule of law and not of men can be read as a
meaningful political ideal.”45 
To be sure, the rules that constrain the legislative process are not
without cost: they hinder, and sometimes frustrate, the majority
party’s ability to govern effectively and to translate its policy agenda
41. Tyler, supra note 40, at 826, 829; see also Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?:
Criteria Used by Citizens To Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
103, 132 (1988).
42. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 376, 379-85
(2003).
43. Id.; see also Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH, supra note 11, at 15, 28-29, 31; cf. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 21-23 (2004) (arguing that a deliberative lawmaking process also
has value in itself, because it respects the moral agency and individual autonomy of the
participants and expresses “mutual respect between decision-makers and their fellow
citizens”); Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political
Science, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 498 (2008) (noting that proceduralist theorists also stress
the values and benefits that are “inherent in the process, not a consequence of it”).
44. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213, 215-16
(1979) (emphasis omitted).
45. Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, Legislatures as Rule-Followers, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 11, at 468, 468-69; Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule
of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91, 107-08 (2007).
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into legislative action. Moreover, by creating multiple “vetogates” in
the legislative process, these rules make defeating legislation easier
than passing it,46 thereby “systematically favor[ing] the legal status
quo.”47 
It appears, however, that the Framers were well aware of this
cost. Alexander Hamilton, for example, acknowledged that bicam-
eralism and presentment will sometimes frustrate the enactment of
good legislation, but believed that “[t]he injury that may possibly be
done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the
advantage of preventing a few bad ones.”48 Moreover, as the Court
concluded in INS v. Chadha, “it is crystal clear from the records of
the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.... There is
unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the
national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process.”49
At the end of the day, “[m]ost participants and outside experts
agree ... that, to function well, a legislative process needs to strike
a balance between deliberation and inclusiveness, on the one hand,
and expeditiousness and decisiveness, on the other, even if there is
46. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66-67 (3d ed. 2001).
47. Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/11/cloture-
constitution-and-democracy.html (Nov. 23, 2009, 01:27 EST). Whether this impact of
lawmaking rules in fact constitutes a cost or a benefit depends on one’s view on the extent
that the legislative process should facilitate or hinder the ability of changing majorities in the
legislature to change the state of the law. For example, a Burkean view that “would be wary
of any major change in our legal arrangements absent truly overwhelming popular support”
would see such an impact as a virtue. Id. Contrary to a common misconception, however, this
view is not contingent upon a particular view on the proper extent of federal government
regulation of private autonomy, economic markets, or the states. Although the lawmaking
rules do hinder the passage of federal legislation, these rules do not necessarily serve a
libertarian view that eschews government regulation, nor do they necessarily operate to
safeguard federalism. Rather, these rules equally restrict Democrats’ attempts to pass
regulation-increasing bills as they constrain Republicans’ efforts to enact legislation rolling
back government regulations when they are in the majority. Hence, the rules do not
systematically favor conservatives or progressives; they systematically favor the status quo.
Id.; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1496 n.7 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard
of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1604-07 (2008).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
49. 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).
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no consensus about what the optimal balance is.”50 Normative
evaluations of the current body of rules that make up the law of
congressional lawmaking, as well as evaluations of the optimal level
of enforcement of these rules, may vary depending on one’s view
about the appropriate balance between these competing values.
What is clear, however, is that these rules are not mere formalities;
they have crucial practical and normative significance, which merits
a detailed evaluation of Congress’s ability to enforce them on itself. 
II. THE FALLIBILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT
Opponents of judicial enforcement of the rules that govern the
legislative process emphasize Congress’s “numerous, effective
techniques” to enforce these rules.51 This Part, however, reveals the
fallibility of congressional enforcement. 
A. Congress’s Enforcement Mechanisms
The rules that govern the enactment process are not self-enforc-
ing.52 They must be actively invoked in order to be enforced, and
consequently, in practice, “the House and Senate are free to evade
their rules simply by ignoring them.”53 The presiding officer of each
chamber may take the initiative and rule that amendments,
motions, or other actions are out of order.54 Usually, however, the
50. Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and
Legislates, in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION?: CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA’S
POLARIZED POLITICS 55, 83 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Sinclair, Congress Deliberates and Legislates]; see also Andrei Marmor, Should We Value
Legislative Integrity?, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 11, at 125, 137 (“[A]
delicate balance ... needs to be maintained between too much and too little partisan political
power. If the [majority party] is very flimsy and the government needs to compromise on every
step it wants to take, governing itself might be seriously compromised. But ... [i]t does not
follow that a good government is one which does not have to compromise with minority
parties.... [I]n a pluralistic society compromise is not a regrettable necessity, but an important
virtue of democratic decision procedures.”).
51. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 7, at 1505-07.
52. RICHARD S. BETH & MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PARLIAMENTARY
REFERENCE SOURCES: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4 (2008), available at http://www.rules.
house.gov/lpp/resources/parl_ref_source.pdf.
53. Bach, supra note 3, at 740.
54. Id. at 739-40.
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presiding officers do not take the initiative to prevent rule viola-
tions.55
Instead, it is up to individual members to identify actions that
violate the rules and raise a timely “point of order.”56 In the House,
the Speaker or the Chair rule on all points of order, while in the
Senate certain questions of order are voted on by the Senators
themselves.57 In both chambers, almost all “[r]ulings of the [presid-
ing officers] may be appealed by any member and usually reversed
by a majority vote of the membership.”58 In practice, however, such
appeals are relatively rare, and very seldom successful, especially
in the House, in which “the chair never loses.”59
With some exceptions, there are limitations in both chambers
concerning when points of order may be raised.60 When a point of
order is not timely raised, it is “effectively waived,” and the violation
of the rule can no longer be challenged.61 In the Senate, unanimous
consent may also preclude points of order.62 In the House, points of
order may be waived by unanimous consent, via suspension of the
rules, or by a special rule reported from the Rules Committee.63 In
practice, many bills in the House are considered under special rules
that expressly waive “one or more—or indeed all—points of order”
against the entire bill or parts of it.64 Hence, while points of order
are Congress’s main mechanism for enforcing the rules that regu-
55. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., POINTS OF ORDER, RULINGS, AND
APPEALS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 (2006), available at http://www.rules.house.
gov/Archives/98-307.pdf; Bach, supra note 3, at 739-40.
56. HEITSHUSEN, supra note 55, at 1. A “point of order” is “a claim, stated by a Member
from the floor, that the [chamber] is violating or about to violate some ... Rule, precedent, or
other procedural authority.” BETH & LYNCH, supra note 52, at 4.
57. Bach, supra note 3, at 740.
58. Id.
59. Chris Den Hartog & Nathan W. Monroe, Partisan Support for Chairs’ Rulings in the
House and Senate 10-11 (Oct. 23, 2009) (unpublished paper prepared for presentation at the
Bicameralism Conference, Vanderbilt University), available at http://faculty.ucmerced.
edu/nmonroe2/Den%20Hartog%20and%20Monroe%20-%20Chairs’%20Rulings.pdf.
60. BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 666-67; FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN,
RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE 993-96 (rev. ed. 1992), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
riddick/browse.html.
61. BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 670.
62. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 60, at 987.
63. BROWN & JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 670.
64. Id. at 670, 827.
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late lawmaking, at least in the House, this mechanism is severely
limited.65 
A less formal enforcement mechanism is legislators’ power to
refuse to vote in favor of a bill that is enacted in violation of the
rules.66 For example, if a bill for raising revenue originates in the
Senate—thus violating the Origination Clause—the House always
has the power to refuse to pass such a bill.67 This power may be
exercised by the majority in each chamber during the final vote on
the bill, or by individual “gatekeepers” who have the power to block
the passage of bills through their control over “vetogates” in the
legislative process.68
Finally, the “enrollment process” provides the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate—the legislative officers—
with another opportunity to block procedural violations. After a bill
passes both chambers in identical form, the final version of the bill,
or the “enrolled bill,” is prepared for presentment to the President.
The legislative clerks examine the accuracy of the enrolled bill and
send it to the legislative officers for signature. The enrolled bill is
then signed by the legislative officers in attestation that the bill has
been duly approved by their respective houses, and presented to the
President.69 As “[t]here is no authority in the presiding officers ... to
attest by their signatures ... any bill not [duly] passed by
Congress,”70 the presiding officers have the duty, and the opportu-
nity, to refuse to sign such bills. 
Once the presiding officers sign the enrolled bill, courts treat
these signatures as “complete and unimpeachable” evidence that a
bill has been properly enacted.71 Consequently, a distinctive feature
of the enforcement of lawmaking rules is that the enforcement takes
place before the fact: all these congressional enforcement mecha-
nisms are designed to prevent rules from being violated before the
65. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 442 (noting that in the House “points of order are
often waived automatically in the special rule structuring the debate ... thus, House members
cannot easily object to violations of congressional rules”).
66. Bach, supra note 3, at 746.
67. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 403-04 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. For more on “gatekeepers” and “vetogates” in the legislative process, see ESKRIDGE ET
AL., supra note 46, at 66-67. 
69. For more on the enrollment process, see Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 328, 336-38.
70. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892).
71. Id. at 672.
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bill becomes a law.72 Given the absence of judicial enforcement of
these rules,73 once the President signs the bill into law, or Congress
passes the bill over his veto, no other enforcement mechanism
exists.
Hence, the enforcement of rules that regulate lawmaking relies
entirely on Congress’s capacity and willingness to enforce these
rules. In particular, in order for these rules to be enforced, two
conditions must be met: (1) some participant in the legislative
process, either individual legislators or legislative officers, must
identify the rule violation in time; and (2) those participants who
have the power to enforce the rule—the legislative officers, the
majorities in each chamber, or other gatekeepers—must be willing
to exercise their enforcement power. As the following cases demon-
strate, when one of these conditions fails, congressional enforcement
fails.
B. Congressional Capacity To Enforce: The Farm Bill
“We haven’t found a precedent for a congressional blunder
of  this magnitude.” 74
“What’s happened here raises serious constitutional
questions—very serious.” 75
The enactment of the original $300 billion Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008 (better known as the Farm Bill) has
prompted divergent reactions. The version of the bill presented to
the President omitted a significant part from the version of the bill
that was actually passed by both chambers of Congress. In fact, the
bill that was presented to the President was missing an entire 34-
page section—all of Title III of the bill.76 And yet, this massive
72. See also Bach, supra note 3, at 726 n.2.
73. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
74. Mary Clare Jalonick, Congressional Error Snarls Effort To Override Bush’s Farm Bill
Veto, STAR-LEDGER, May 22, 2008 (quoting Scott Stanzel, a White House spokesperson).
75. Problems with Congress Override of Farm Bill, CNN, May 22, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/2008/POLITICS/05/22/farm.bill/index.html (quoting Minority Leader John Boehner).
76. See Validity of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 32 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/validity-farm-bill-energy-
act-2008.pdf; Jalonick, supra note 74.
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omission was discovered only after President Bush vetoed the bill
and Congress passed it over his veto.77
This case is not the first in which provisions that passed both
houses of Congress were omitted from the bill presented to the
President; nor is it the first time in which breaches of constitutional
requirements were discovered only after the faulty bill was ap-
proved and published as law.78 It is also not the first case to
illustrate that the length, scope, and complexity of omnibus bills
(and the highly accelerated pace of their enactment) often make it
impossible for legislators, or even legislative leaders, to be aware of
all the provisions in the bill;79 nor is it the first case to demonstrate
that this reality often creates errors,80 as well as enables individual
members “to perpetuate a good deal of statutory mischief.”81
The Farm Bill is particularly interesting, however, because of the
magnitude of the discrepancy in this case between the bill passed by
Congress and the bill presented to the President. Indeed, the fact
that no one in Congress—or the White House—was able to notice
such a conspicuous discrepancy suggests that less noticeable
procedural violations may often go undetected. Hence, this case
clearly illustrates that massive omnibus bills increase the risk of
violations of lawmaking rules, deliberate or inadvertent, and signif-
icantly undermine the ability of Congress to detect these violations.
77. Consequently, Congress eventually had to enact the entire bill all over again,
including another supermajority passage over a second presidential veto. See Congress Passes
Farm Bill Over Bush Veto, CNN, June 18, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/18/
farm.bill/index.html.
78. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 338; J.A.C. Grant, Judicial Control of the
Legislative Process: The Federal Rule, 3 W. POL. Q. 364, 368 (1950). For other examples of
such cases, see Validity of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 76.
79. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 15, at 137 (“[W]hen all the provisions are rolled into one
bill, it is impossible for any member to know the contents of the bills voted on.... Indeed, many
votes are for legislation in which the individual member has no idea what is contained
therein.”); see also Denning & Smith, supra note 15, at 958-60, 971-76.
80. For example, in the case of a giant 2004 appropriations bill, only after the bill had
passed was it discovered that a provision that would allow appropriations staff to access
individual tax returns, and exempt the staff from criminal penalties for revealing the contents
of those returns, was somehow inserted into the bill. The chair of the subcommittee in charge
of the bill later admitted that even he had no idea that language was in the bill. THOMAS E.
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND
HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 173-74 (2008).
81. Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 22 (2007); see also Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 338-40.
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More generally, this case suggests that a will to enforce lawmak-
ing rules is a necessary but insufficient condition: even if Congress
is genuinely motivated to enforce these rules, due to legislative
practices such as omnibus legislation, its capacity to do so is
limited.82
C. Congressional Will To Enforce: The Deficit Reduction Act of
2005
“It’s grade school stuff: To become law, a bill must pass both
houses of Congress in identical form and be signed by the
president or approved over his veto.... Unless, that is ... comply-
ing with the Constitution would be really, really inconvenient
to President Bush and Republican congressional leaders.” 83
The enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA)
has been described by some as “‘a conspiracy’ to violate the
Constitution,”84 or as a “legally improper arrangement among
certain representatives of the House, Senate, and Executive Branch
to have the President sign legislation that had not been enacted
pursuant to the Constitution.”85
In this case, the House passed a bill that was identical to the bill
passed by the Senate in all but one provision.86 In budgetary terms,
this seemingly minor difference had significant fiscal consequences,
amounting to an estimated $2 billion.87 More importantly, this
82. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 339-40. 
83. Editorial, Not a Law: A Bill Passed by Only One House of Congress Just Doesn’t Count,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at A16.
84. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/
02/q-when-is-bill-signed-by-president-not.html (Feb. 10, 2006, 10:33 EST) (“[The DRA case
was] in fact, a ‘conspiracy’ to violate the Constitution. That is to say, [House Speaker] Dennis
Hastert has violated his constitutional oath by attesting to the accuracy of the bill, knowing
that the House version was different (and having intentionally avoided fixing the discrepancy
when it came to his attention before the House vote). And [President pro tempore of the
Senate] Stevens and the President are coconspirators, assuming they, too, knew about the
problem before they attested to and signed the bill, respectively.”).
85. OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
86. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 331-32.
87. Pub. Citizen v. Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 111 n.7 (D.D.C.
2006).
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discrepancy constituted a violation of Article I, Section 7’s bicameral
requirement.
The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of
the Senate were apparently well aware of this discrepancy.88
Nevertheless, they allegedly chose to sign the enrolled bill in
attestation that the bill was duly enacted by Congress, and to
knowingly present to the President a bill that was never passed in
identical form by both houses.89 President Bush was also allegedly
aware of this constitutional violation, but signed the bill into law
nonetheless.90
The DRA is a clear example of a case in which Congress identified
the rule violation in time, but those in the position to enforce the
constitutional rule intentionally chose to ignore their obligation. It
demonstrates that mechanisms and opportunities to enforce the
rules may not suffice if the will to employ these enforcement mech-
anisms is lacking. 
D. When the Enforcers Are the Violators: The 2003 Medicare Bill
“Never have I seen such a grotesque, arbitrary, and gross
abuse of power.... It was an outrage. It was profoundly ugly
and beneath the dignity of Congress.” 91
Under House rules, electronic voting is the preferred method to
conduct record votes.92 Generally, members may cast their votes
through voting machines or manually, and may change their vote
any number of times until the vote is closed.93 The vote is directed
and controlled by the Chair, who must exercise her power according
88. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 332.
89. See JOHN W. DEAN, BROKEN GOVERNMENT: HOW REPUBLICAN RULE DESTROYED THE
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 51-54 (2007); Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note
3, at 332 & n.44; Lederman, supra note 84.
90. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 3, at 332.
91. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 3.
92. HOUSE RULES, supra note 28, R. XX(2)(a).
93. For a much more detailed explanation, see SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
VOTING IRREGULARITIES OF AUGUST 2, 2007, FINAL REPORT AND SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, H.R.
REP. NO. 110-885, at 3-5 (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:hr885.110.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON VOTING
IRREGULARITIES]. 
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to the applicable rules, precedents, and practices of the House and
in a nonpartisan and impartial manner.94 
One of the important powers of the Chair is the authority to close
the vote and announce the vote’s result.95 The House rules state that
there is a fifteen-minute minimum for most electronic votes;96 and
according to established House practice, once the minimum time for
a vote has expired, the Chair should close the vote as soon as
possible.97 The Chair may hold the vote open for an additional
minute or two to allow latecomers to cast a vote; however, since
electronic voting began in 1973, it has been an established and clear
norm that the Chair may not keep the vote open beyond fifteen
minutes in order to change the outcome of the vote.98 For over two
decades, this norm was apparently breached only once.99 
All this changed, however, in the enactment of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(the Medicare Bill). When the time for debate on the Medicare Bill
had ended, at 3 a.m., the Chair announced that “Members will have
fifteen minutes to record their votes.”100 When the official time
expired, at 3:15 a.m., it was clear that a majority of the House had
voted against the bill.101 Although the majority of the House clearly
expressed its will, the Chair held the vote open for nearly three
hours until the majority party’s leadership was able to convince
enough members to switch their votes.102 At 5:53 a.m., after almost
three hours in which the official tally of the votes had consistently
shown a majority against the bill, the majority party was finally
able to secure a majority in favor of the bill. At this point, “[t]he
gavel came down quickly,”103 and the Chair declared that the bill
had passed.104
94. Id. at 8-10.
95. Id. at 8.
96. HOUSE RULES, supra note 28, R. XX(2)(a).
97. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id. at 1-2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. 149 CONG. REC. 30855 (2003) (statement of Speaker pro tempore).
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This case illustrates that even seemingly technical rules can serve
important objectives, such as ensuring that the will of the chamber
rather than the will of its legislative officer is enacted into law, and
that violations of such rules can significantly impact the outcome of
the legislative process. Indeed, although other process abuses occur-
red in the enactment process of the Medicare Bill,105 it was this act
that particularly outraged House members who opposed the bill.
One member complained, “They grossly abused the rules of the
House by holding the vote open. The majority of the House ex-
pressed its will, 216 to 218. It means it’s a dictatorship. It means
you hold the vote open until you have the votes.”106 
After this incident, stretching out the vote until the majority
party “could twist enough arms to prevail” became a recurring
problem.107 To solve this problem, in January 2007 the new House
majority amended the House rules, adding the following explicit
rule: “[a] record vote by electronic device shall not be held open for
the sole purpose of reversing the outcome of such vote.”108 
Nevertheless, violations of this rule continued.109 Furthermore,
any real possibility of congressional enforcement was soon under-
mined. When minority party members tried to raise a point of order,
the Chair held that this rule does not establish a point of order and
does not have an immediate procedural remedy.110 The rule was also
105. Other abuses included, inter alia, exclusion of minority party members from the
House-Senate conference committee, insertion of major provisions that were rejected during
earlier floor debates into the conference report, and even allegations that the majority party
tried to secure the necessary votes for passing the bill through threats and bribes. See MANN
& ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 1-4, 6, 137-38; Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A
Constitutional Analysis of Legislative Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 1, 11-12 (2006).
106. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 3. Some majority party members argued,
however, that holding votes open was not, “technically speaking,” a violation of the rules,
because House rules do not state a formal maximum time for votes. Id. at 4.
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 110th CONG., R. XX(2)(a) (2008), available
at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf.
109. See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 216; Committee on Rules-Republicans, 
Democrats Break Their Own Rules, Refuse To Own Up, Mar. 12, 2008, http://rules-
republicans.house.gov/ShortTopics/Read.aspx?ID=170; Jackie Kucinich, Rep. Gohmert Accuses
Dems of Holding Vote Open, HILL, May 24, 2007, http://thehill.com/homenews/ news/12029-
rep-gohmert-accuses-dems-of-holding-vote-open; Jim Mills, Pelosi Admits To Breaking House
Rules—Sorta, HILL, Mar. 13, 2008, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/ lawmaker-
news/32935-pelosi-admits-to-breaking-house-rules-sorta.
110. See REPORT ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES, supra note 93, at 23 (citing 76 CONG. REC.
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interpreted as focusing entirely on the Chair’s intent and as
prohibiting only cases in which the Chair’s exclusive motivation for
holding the vote open was to change the outcome.111 It was further
stated that it would be inappropriate to require the Chair to declare
her reasons for delaying a vote.112 The practical result was that it
became “impossible for the House to determine whether the Chair
had the requisite intent necessary to find a violation of the rule.”113 
Eventually, following a case in which the Chair closed a vote
before the required minimum time expired, allegedly to preclude the
minority party from winning the vote,114 a select committee, which
investigated voting irregularities in the House, concluded that
although the new rule “was enacted with a noble intent,” it was “at
best, difficult to enforce.”115 Consequently, in January 2009, the new
House majority deleted this rule from the House rules.116 The select
committee emphasized that “striking the sentence in question” from
the rules should not reduce the Chair’s obligation to refrain from
holding the vote open in order to change the outcome of the vote,117
but seemed to conclude that ultimately “[t]he dignity and integrity
of the proceedings of the House are dependent upon the dignity and
integrity of its Speaker and those she appoints to serve in the
Chair.”118
The failure to enforce this rule, which was supposed to curb
abuses by the Chair during votes, reveals the fallibility of Con-
gress’s enforcement mechanisms, especially with regard to rules




114. Jonathan Weisman & Elizabeth Williamson, House Forms Special Panel Over Alleged
Stolen Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/08/03/AR2007080300878.html.
115. REPORT ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES, supra note 93, at 22 (quoting Investigative
Hearing Regarding Roll Call 814, Day 1: Hearing Before the Select Comm. to Investigate the
Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007, 111th Cong. 4 (2008) (opening statement of Rep.
William Delahunt, Chairman of the Select Committee)). The Select Committee also found that
the rule was a “catalyst” for other voting irregularities, such as prematurely closing the vote.
Id. at 17-22.
116. See H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. § 2(h) (2009), available at http://www.rules.house.
gov/111/LegText/111_hres_ruleschnge.pdf.
117. REPORT ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES, supra note 93, at 23.
118. Id.
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that are supposed to control the behavior of the presiding officers.
Legislative officers are the primary and final enforcers of lawmak-
ing rules.119 This case illustrates that the legislative officers can also
be the primary violators of these rules. When the legislative
officers—or other chamber and committee leaders that are essential
in enforcing lawmaking rules—are the ones perpetrating the rule
violations, the congressional enforcement mechanisms are particu-
larly likely to fail.120
In sum, enforcement of lawmaking rules is entirely contingent
upon legislators’ and legislative leaders’ motivation to enforce these
rules. Furthermore, because Congress’s capacity to detect violations
is limited, congressional compliance with these rules also largely
depends on legislators’ incentives to follow the rules in the first
place. The crucial question, therefore, is: what are the political
safeguards that may motivate legislators to engage in self-policing
and rule-following behavior?121
III. THE MYTH OF POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 
One of the dominant arguments against judicial review of the
legislative process is that Congress has sufficient incentives to en-
force the law of congressional lawmaking on its own.122 Arguments
that “legislators have greater incentives [to act as responsible
constitutional decision makers] than scholars typically assert” are
also prominent among critics of judicial review and judicial
supremacy in other areas.123 Their common argument is that legal
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. Cf. Kysar, supra note 3, at 549 (making a similar argument in the “earmark rules”
context that the “largest threat to the faithful adherence” to these rules is intentional
violations by their enforcers).
121. Cf. Richard D. McKelvey & Peter C. Ordeshook, An Experimental Study of the Effects
of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior, 46 J. POL. 182, 201 (1984) (“[T]heoretical
investigations that seek to uncover the effects of procedural rules and institutional constraints
must take cognizance of incentives and opportunities for people to disregard those rules and
constraints.”).
122. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 7, at 1505-07.
123. Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures, supra note 11, at 356; see also, e.g., MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 65-66 (1999); Philip P. Frickey
& Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708-09 (2002); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian
Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1286-90 (2001);
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scholarship tends to rely on the public choice theory’s over-simpli-
fied and overly cynical assumption that legislators are self-inter-
ested, single-minded reelection seekers.124
This Article’s inquiry begins, therefore, with the assumption that
legislators are motivated by a combination of self-interest and
public-regarding motivations,125 and that they simultaneously
pursue multiple goals, such as reelection, power and prestige in
Washington, and ideology and desire to make good public policy.126
Based on this premise, and drawing on a combination of sources
from a wide array of theoretical perspectives, including legal,
political science, political economy, and social psychology scholar-
ship, I have identified seven major political safeguards that are
supposed to induce congressional self policing and rule following:
(1) reelection motivations and electoral controls; (2) interest groups;
(3) policy motivations; (4) political parties and party leaders;
(5) institutional rivalry and institutional interests; (6) the threat of
a presidential veto; and (7) ethical and noninstrumental moti-
vations.127
Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294-97.
124. See sources cited supra note 123; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 39 (arguing
that “ideology and a desire to make good policy play a far more significant role in determining
legislators’ voting behavior than public choice theory gives them credit for”).
125. See Colin Jennings & Iain McLean, Political Economics and Normative Analysis, 13
NEW POL. ECON. 61, 66, 69-71 (2008) (noting that even political economists are increasingly
acknowledging that politicians are not purely self-interested, and demonstrating greater
willingness to include public-regarding motivations in political economics models).
126. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973); John W. Kingdon,
Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563, 569-70 (1977); see also DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21 & n.39 (1991)
(arguing that Fenno’s multiple-goal suggestion is “[s]urely closer to reality” than Mayhew’s
reelection model, and citing empirical studies that support Fenno’s suggestion); Garrett &
Vermeule, supra note 123, at 1287-88 (arguing that Fenno’s multiple-goal view became “[t]he
mainstream view in political science”). For a different view, emphasizing reelection above all
other goals, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5-6, 13-17 (2d ed.
2004).
127. This list of safeguards is drawn from a combination of a wide array of sources, most
notably GLENN R. PARKER, SELF-POLICING IN POLITICS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
REPUTATIONAL CONTROLS ON POLITICIANS 26-27 (2004); ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED
PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5-12
(2001); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 117-23 (2d ed. 2006); Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities, and Some Puzzles, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 447, 472-75 (2008) [hereinafter Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto]; Bruhl, Judicial
Confirmation Process, supra note 15, at 1011-13; Cox, supra note 36, at 170; C. Lawrence
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Part III systematically evaluates each of these safeguards’
projected impact on Congress’s compliance with the rules that set
procedural restrictions on the legislative process,128 in light of
theoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress and
its legislative process.
Close consideration of these safeguards is crucial for rebutting a
number of misconceptions about legislative rule following. The
following examination refutes the widely held assumption that
political safeguards can obviate the need for judicial enforcement of
lawmaking rules. It argues that some of these political safeguards
actually induce lawbreaking rather than law-following behavior,
whereas others are too weak to outweigh this impact.
A. Reelection Motivations and Electoral Controls
There is widespread agreement in the congressional decision-
making literature, even among scholars who hold the multiple-goal
view, that reelection is an important goal for legislators.129 The
connection between legislators’ reelection motivation and rule
following is straightforward: legislators will refrain from violating
rules if such violations increase the likelihood of electoral defeat.130
Of course, the reelection motivation is an ineffective control mech-
anism over legislators who are seeking retirement and are not
interested in reelection.131 However, Part III.A argues that even for
reelection-seeking legislators there are significant obstacles in
harnessing their strong reelection motivation into an effective
control mechanism over their behavior in the legislative process.
Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 490, 493-94 (Paul J.
Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2006) [hereinafter Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform];
Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 123, at 1286-90; Schauer, supra note 45, at 473-75; Sinclair,
Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294-97; Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures,
supra note 11.
128. For more on the type of rules covered by this inquiry, see supra Part I.A.
129. See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation To Defect: A Political and Economic
Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801,
831 (1997).
130. See Schauer, supra note 45, at 474-75; Tushnet, Interpretations in Legislatures, supra
note 11, at 361.
131. PARKER, supra note 127, at 27.
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1. Voters’ Inattention and (Rational) Ignorance
In order for violations of lawmaking rules to increase the
likelihood of electoral defeat, voters must be aware of these vio-
lations. However, most rule violations in the legislative process are
likely to escape voters’ attention.
Due to the high cost of obtaining the relevant information, voters’
negligible incentive to obtain it, and free-rider problems, it is
rational for voters to remain largely ignorant of legislators’ behavior
in the legislative process.132 Political economists term this phenome-
non voters’ “rational ignorance.”133 Notwithstanding other disagree-
ments over political economists’ assumptions about voters,134 polit-
ical scientists seem to agree that there is indeed “widespread voter
inattention” to the legislative process:135 “The vast majority of voters
do not pay much attention to most of the roll calls that occur on
Capitol Hill; much less the more insulated activities that occur in
committee. As a result, House members and Senators have signifi-
cant discretion about how to conduct their legislative work.”136
Surveys consistently confirm that the vast majority of the public
does not regularly “follow what’s going on in government and public
affairs,”137 and that people are largely unaware of congressional
actions.138 In fact, one study found that people were rarely aware of
even a single policy position taken by their district representa-
132. See Block-Lieb, supra note 129, at 820 & n.93, 821 & nn.94-95; Peter T. Leeson, How
Much Benevolence is Benevolent Enough?, 126 PUB. CHOICE 357, 360, 363 (2006).
133. Leeson, supra note 132, at 360.
134. For criticism of economic theories’ assumptions about voters, see, for example, FARBER
& FRICKEY, supra note 126, at 24-33; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 77-80 (1990).
135. C. Lawrence Evans, The One Thing You Need To Know about Congress: The Middle
Doesn’t Rule 20 (Nov. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wmpeople.
wm.edu/asset/index/clevan/niemi [hereinafter Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule].
136. Id. at 7-8.
137. AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL
BEHAVIOR tbl.6D.5 (2008), http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab6d_5.htm
[hereinafter ANES GUIDE]; see also id. tbl.5B.1, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/
toptable/tab5b_1.htm (finding that roughly 60 to 70 percent of respondents consistently agree
that “[s]ometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t
really understand what’s going on”).
138. John R. Hibbing, Images of Congress, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, supra note 127,
at 461, 482.
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tives,139 and there is reason to believe that voters’ knowledge of their
representatives’ performance in procedural matters is even lower.140
Surveys have consistently shown, moreover, that voters’ igno-
rance is not limited to specific congressional actions.141 For example,
45 percent of American adults cannot name either of their state’s
U.S. senators;142 and, “at any given time, approximately 40 to 65
percent do not know which party is in control of the House of
Representatives,”143 which is particularly remarkable, given that “50
percent should be able to get this answer correct merely by guess-
ing.”144 Ignorance about the rules that govern the legislative process
is even greater.145 A recent survey found, for example, that 74
percent of the public do not know that it takes sixty votes to break
a filibuster in the Senate, perhaps the most well-known and hotly-
debated of all legislative rules.146 These findings significantly
undermine the assumption that the public can hold lawmakers
accountable for violating lawmaking rules.
2. Voters’ Electoral Choices
Even if some rule violations do receive public attention, legisla-
tors would not be deterred from rule violations unless such viola-
139. Id. at 474.
140. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12 (arguing that “few people outside
the Capitol Beltway pay attention to procedural votes”); see also Amber Wichowsky, Throw
the Bums Out: Competition and Accountability in Congressional Elections 2 (Feb. 16, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/apw/archives/APW_
wichowsky.pdf (citing several studies that confirm that “citizens know little to nothing about
their legislator’s roll-call votes and about the policy process more generally”).
141. Hibbing, supra note 138, at 471.
142. Id. Furthermore, 75 percent do not know the length of a senator’s term, 45 percent do
not know that each state has two senators, and 56 percent cannot name even a single branch
of government. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 471-72. Furthermore, these findings probably overestimate people’s knowledge,
because politically unknowledgeable people are more likely to refuse to participate in political
surveys. Id. at 472.
145. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, SENATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A MYSTERY TO MANY 1, 3 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/586/; see also Posting
of Jennifer Agiesta to The Washington Post: Behind the Numbers, http://voices.
washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2010/03/the_public_on_procedure.html (Mar. 17,
2010, 12:28 EST).
146. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, supra note 145, at 3.
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tions significantly influence their constituency’s voting decision.147
It is highly unlikely, however, that a significant percentage of voters
use conformity with lawmaking rules as a key criterion in their
electoral choice.148
To be sure, studies by social psychologists and political scientists
suggest that people do care about process and procedural fairness
in the legislative process;149 and yet, this does not mean that
legislators’ procedural performance will significantly determine
voters’ decisions. As two of the leading scholars in the field explain:
[I]t would be erroneous to expect process perceptions to help
people decide whether they are Democrat or Republican or
whether to support candidate A or candidate B.... [P]rocess
factors are of little use in such tasks as voting decisions....
Assessments of individual officeholders also are not likely to be
affected by process concerns .... We expect process concerns to
play a much larger part in such broad variables as whether
people approve of government and whether they view it as
legitimate and therefore are willing to comply with the laws it
produces.150
147. Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294.
148. Cf. Schauer, supra note 45, at 474 n.21 (arguing that “there may be little reason to
believe that the electorate will punish legislators for violating legislature-constraining rules”
in the passage of policies that voters perceive as “wise and popular”); Frederick Schauer, The
Questions of Authority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 104-10, 114 (1992) (presenting anecdotal evidence
that citizens do not always expect officials to blindly follow the law); Sinclair, Can Congress
Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294 (arguing that it is “certainly a heroic assumption” to think
that “constituents use conformity with the Constitution as a key criterion of electoral choice,”
and suggesting that it is unlikely that there are enough such voters to make a difference);
Emily Badger, It’s Not About Process, Stupid, MILLER-MCCUNE, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.
miller-mccune.com/politics/its-not-about-process-stupid-11524/ (suggesting that voters care
little about the legislative process surrounding health care reform).
149. See supra Part I.B. But see Agiesta, supra note 145 (noting that recent polls suggest
the public’s take on parliamentary procedure is based more on the result and partisan
affiliation than the process).
150. John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Process Preferences and American Politics:
What the People Want Government To Be, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 150 (2001); see also Tyler,
supra note 40, at 818, 820-21 (finding that the use of fair decision-making procedures
significantly enhances the legitimacy of Congress; but on the question of whether people will
be more willing to vote for members of Congress who support a procedurally fair policy
decision that the voters disagree with, conceding that the primary direct influence on
willingness to vote is agreement with the outcome).
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That voters do care about the integrity of the legislative process
but are nevertheless unlikely to base their voting decisions on this
preference underscores the weakness of elections as an enforcement
mechanism. In making their voting decisions, voters must make up
their mind based on a complex combination of potentially competing
considerations, such as the candidates’ records, party affiliations,
personalities, and other qualities, as well as their policy positions
on a variety of different issues.151 At the same time, however,
“[e]ach voter has just one vote per election.... There is simply no way
for a voter to vote for Smith on the economy and health reform
while voting for Jones on [his rule-following performance].”152
Consequently, voting “is simply too blunt an instrument to be an
effective means for” punishing legislators for rule violations in the
legislative process.153 
3. Uncompetitive Elections and Incumbents’ Electoral Security
Even if voters were fully informed about legislators’ rule viola-
tions and had strong rule-following preferences that influenced their
voting decisions, other factors in the contemporary political system
significantly hinder “voters’ ability to strip incumbents of their
power.”154 
Over the past several decades, a combination of factors has
dramatically increased incumbents’ electoral advantages in con-
gressional elections, and created progressively rising barriers to
151. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, at 37 (Jan. 20, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&
exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=163372 [hereinafter Briffault, Campaign Finance]; see
also PARKER, supra note 127, at 106-11 (discussing the factors that influence electoral choice
in congressional voting).
152. Briffault, Campaign Finance, supra note 151, at 36-38 (making this argument in the
campaign finance context: “the idea that the voter can use the election to hold candidates
accountable for accepting donations the voter finds troublesome fails to recognize how voting
works”).
153. Id. at 37; see also James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of
Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55, 56-60 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (arguing
that voting is more about selecting “good types” of politicians, in terms of their perceived
character and policy positions, than about disciplining incumbents’ past behavior).
154. PATRICK BASHAM & DENNIS POLHILL, CATO INST., UNCOMPETITIVE ELECTIONS AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2005), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa547.pdf.
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electoral competition.155 Some scholars have noted, for example, that
the dramatic growth in the costs of running for Congress and the
increasing financial advantages of incumbents have undermined the
financial competitiveness of challengers.156 Other scholars highlight
advantages that derive from holding office, such as increasing
governmentally funded resources for constituency-service and
constituency-contact activities157 or the introduction of television
cameras in the legislature, which affords incumbents television
exposure that would be expensive for political challengers to
replicate.158 Others argue that computer-driven gerrymandering has
made the vast majority of districts noncompetitive.159 Finally, some
studies emphasize demographic changes, including growing parti-
san polarization within the electorate160 and voters’ increasing
reliance on incumbency as a voting cue.161 
At any rate, there seems to be significant agreement that the
result of these factors “is a pattern of reinforcing advantages that
leads to extraordinarily uncompetitive elections.”162 In fact, only 11
155. Glenn R. Parker & Jun Young Choi, Barriers to Competition and the Effect on Political
Shirking: 1953-1992, 126 PUB. CHOICE 297, 297-99 (2006).
156. Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition
in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 82-84, 87 (2006) [hereinafter Abramowitz et al.,
Incumbency].
157. Parker & Choi, supra note 155, at 298-99.
158. Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, Legislative Television as an
Institutional Entry Barrier: The Impact of C-SPAN2 on Turnover in the U.S. Senate, 1946-
1998, 112 PUB. CHOICE 433, 434, 444-45 (2002).
159. Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way To Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 395, 408 (2009); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 624 (2002). But see Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in
Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 410-11 (2005) (“The threat
gerrymandering poses to competitiveness comes not from districting per se, but from the
interplay of gerrymandering with a host of other political factors. The extent to which district-
level competition is in decline or that gerrymandering is responsible is debatable.”). For more
on this debate, compare, for example, Michael P. McDonald, Drawing the Line on District
Competition, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 91 (2006) (contending that redistricting has reduced the
number of competitive congressional districts), with Alan Abramowitz et al., Drawing the Line
on District Competition: A Rejoinder, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 95 (2006) (concluding that
redistricting is not responsible for declining competition in House elections).
160. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, supra note 156, at 77, 86-87.
161. Parker & Choi, supra note 155, at 298.
162. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, supra note 156, at 86; see also BASHAM & POLHILL,
supra note 154, at 2-7; Parker & Choi, supra note 155, at 298. But see Nathaniel Persily, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
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percent of the congressional races in 2008 had a sufficiently small
victory margin—10 percent or lower—that could be categorized as
competitive.163 In 2002, only 8.7 percent of the races were competi-
tive;164 in 2004, only 5.2 percent of the races were competitive;165 and
even in the 2006 congressional elections, which were the most
competitive in a decade, only 13.7 percent were competitive.166
Empirical studies about “incumbency advantage” show that
incumbency significantly raises the probability of electoral success,
with some studies finding that congressional incumbents enjoy an
11 percent increase in expected vote share merely for being an
incumbent candidate.167 Reelection data also confirms that members
of Congress in both houses enjoy significant electoral safety, with
over 90 percent reelection rates for incumbents in recent years,168
and with the vast majority of incumbents winning by a landslide.169
In fact, in each of the recent congressional elections, dozens of
incumbents went completely unchallenged.170 With such levels of
electoral safety and lack of electoral competition in Congress,
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 653-65 (2002) (arguing that “[c]oncentrating
on district-level competition ... distracts attention from abundant evidence of competition in
the political system as a whole,” and that the indisputable high rates of incumbent reelection
and large margins of victory, as well as the declining number of marginal districts, tell only
part of the story). 
163. Center for Voting and Democracy, Dubious Democracy 2008: Overview and Data,
http://www.fairvote.org/overview-and-data (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
164. BASHAM & POLHILL, supra note 154, at 3.
165. Center for Voting and Democracy, Dubious Democracy 2007: U.S. National Profile,
http://www.archive.fairvote.org/?page=2113 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
166. Id.
167. BASHAM & POLHILL, supra note 154, at 2-3, 15 nn.12-13, 16 nn.15-16.
168. Wichowsky, supra note 140, at 1. In each of the 2000, 2002, and 2004 congressional
elections, for example, the reelection rate for House incumbents was over 98 percent. BASHAM
& POLHILL, supra note 154, at 3. Even in the 2006 congressional election—in which an
unusually high number of seats changed hands, and despite polls indicating that only 16
percent of Americans believed most members of Congress deserved reelection—voters
reelected 95 percent of the incumbent Representatives who ran in the election. Christopher
M. Straw, The Role of Electoral Accountability in the Madisonian Machine, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 321, 322-23 & nn.4-5 (2008). For more on senators’ reelection rates, see Persily,
supra note 162, at 665. See also Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., Why Do Incumbent Senators
Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model 17-21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10748, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10748.
169. See BASHAM & POLHILL, supra note 154, at 3; sources cited supra note 163.
170. See sources cited supra note 163.
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especially in the House, some have argued that “[a]s a general
matter, congressional accountability appears to be dead.”171 
Some scholars maintain, however, that the indisputably high
levels of electoral safety in Congress do not necessarily undermine
the “electoral connection” theory of congressional behavior.172 They
claim that “[m]embers of Congress do not behave as if they are
invulnerable to electoral defeat ... because they subscribe to the idea
that they are ... ‘unsafe at any margin.’”173 The argument, in effect,
is that congressional behavior is less determined by the objective
measures of electoral safety, but rather by legislators’ subjective
feelings of electoral insecurity.174 Consequently, they claim that
notwithstanding objective electoral safety, legislators are in fact
attentive to constituent preferences and potential electoral conse-
quences in their policy decisions.175
However, even if we accept the argument that congressional
behavior is mostly influenced by legislators’ subjective beliefs about
electoral insecurity, it appears that when it comes to lawmaking
rules, members of Congress feel relatively secure from electoral
retribution. As political scientist Gary Cox suggests, “[i]n a world in
which the effects of [lawmaking] rules on final outcomes are obscure
to voters, members fear electoral retribution from their constituents
less than they would on straightforward votes on substance.”176 
This claim is confirmed by empirical evidence that “members
increasingly act very differently when they vote on procedure and
when they vote on substance.”177 Thus, for example, legislators often
171. Straw, supra note 168, at 323.
172. See Persily, supra note 162, at 659-60; David A.M. Peterson et al., Congressional
Response to Mandate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 411, 412-13 (2003); Wichowsky, supra note
140, at 1-2.
173. Persily, supra note 162, at 659-60; Peterson et al., supra note 172, at 412.
174. See generally Jeffrey E. Cohen, Perceptions of Electoral Insecurity Among Members
Holding Safe Seats in a U.S. State Legislature, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 365 (1984).
175. Peterson et al., supra note 172, at 412-13. At least one empirical study challenges this
claim, however, by demonstrating that the objective decline in electoral competition in fact
correlates with an increase in “shirking,” that is, deviation from constituent preferences, in
legislators’ roll-call decisions. See Parker & Choi, supra note 155, at 310-11.
176. Cox, supra note 36, at 187; see also Monroe & Robinson, supra note 37, at 218 (noting
that “members have less reason to fear being held accountable by their constituents for votes
they make on the procedural maneuvers of their party leadership ... than for votes on the
substance of policy”).
177. Sean M. Theriault, Procedural Polarization in the U.S. Congress 16 (Mar. 24, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/apw/archives/theriault
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vote in favor of a procedure that facilitates the passage of a
bill—such as restrictive rules that sharply curtail the ability to offer
amendments on the floor—and then vote against the bill itself.178
The explanation to this seemingly puzzling behavior is that
“members increasingly listen to their party on procedure and to
their constituents on substance,”179 based on their widely held belief
that “few people outside the Capitol Beltway pay attention to
procedural votes.”180 Indeed, many legislators, political consultants,
and candidates share the belief that most voters do not care about
procedural issues and that procedural votes are much less visible to
voters.181 
The bottom line is that from both the perspective of objective
electoral safety and legislators’ subjective perceptions of electoral
security, violations of lawmaking rules are largely insulated from
electoral accountability. Hence, the prospect that voters will
effectively police legislators’ rule-following behavior in the legisla-
tive process, or induce reelection-minded legislators to police
themselves, seems grim. Furthermore, as Parts III.B-H explain, to
the extent that the reelection goal motivates legislators to satisfy
special interest groups, to make public policy, or to follow their
party leaders’ instructions, all of these considerations may in fact
induce rule violations.
.pdf. 
178. Cox, supra note 36, at 183-84; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12.
179. Theriault, supra note 177, at 16.
180. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12; Theriault, supra note 177, at 11-12,
15-16 (finding support for the “parties care about procedures; constituents care about
substance” explanation for this behavior); see also Cox, supra note 36, at 183-84; Monroe &
Robinson, supra note 37, at 218.
181. DEAN, supra note 89, at 4-5, 8-9. Admittedly, there may be a limited exception to this
assumption, namely, when the bill in question receives wide public attention and the impact
of the procedural vote on the final outcome is relatively transparent. The best example is
probably the House’s final procedural votes in passing President Obama’s health care
legislation. Even in this exceptional case of rare public attention to the legislative process,
however, it was highly debatable whether the public actually understood or cared about the
procedural rules. See Agiesta, supra note 145; Badger, supra note 148; Amy Goldstein, House
Democrats’ Tactic for Health-Care Bill is Debated, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1; Adam
Nagourney, Procedural Maneuvering and Public Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at WK1.
At any rate, for the vast majority of procedural votes, legislators can safely assume that their
vote will not have significant electoral consequences.
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B. Interest Groups
Although political unawareness and organization problems
plague the vast majority of voters, there are subsets of the constitu-
ency, such as organized advocacy groups, that are politically aware
and relatively well organized.182 Political scientists James Snyder
and Michael Ting argue that some “activist groups,” such as the
Sierra Club or NAACP, “have the attention of large numbers of
voters in many constituencies,” and therefore may potentially
provide “the link between desired punishment strategies and voter
actions.”183 They argue that “[b]y coordinating voting behavior
through publications, advertisements, or endorsements, such groups
can tune the responses of voters to incumbent behavior over
multiple elections.”184 Undeniably, activist groups may solve some
electoral accountability deficiencies—particularly, voters’ political
unawareness, indifference, and coordination problems—in certain
areas, and legislators do seem to pay attention to such groups.185 
However, activist groups are unlikely to serve as a significant
force in the lawmaking rules context. First, it is unlikely that there
are many activist groups whose agendas focus on ensuring compli-
ance with the procedural rules constraining the legislative process.
Because organized voter groups are highly susceptible to free-rider
problems that can undermine their effectiveness, activist groups
tend to be most effective when focused on specific, narrow issues.186
As examples like the National Education Association, the Sierra
Club, and the NAACP illustrate, these narrow issues are more
likely to revolve around specific ideological and policy issues.187
182. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 5-6.
183. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting, Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of
Politicians, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 482, 483 (2008).
184. Id.
185. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 7 (arguing that members of Congress
“pay particular attention to the preferences of issue publics,” advocacy groups, “and organized
interests because they are an important source of campaign resources,” and because
“[a]dvocacy groups engage in grassroots mobilization efforts that potentially can sway the
attitudes of less politically aware constituents”).
186. Block-Lieb, supra note 129, at 822-23.
187. Cf. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 6-7 (suggesting that the organized
advocacy groups tend to form around specific policy areas). This conclusion is also
corroborated by research about the forces that influence congressional reform, which indicates
that “advocacy organizations are activated by reform initiatives that directly affect the ability
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Even activist groups such as Common Cause or the Center for
Responsive Politics that are more generally interested in the
political process typically focus on areas such as elections, lobbying,
and campaign finance, rather than on floor procedures and proce-
dural rule following in the legislative process.188 
Second, as public choice scholars argue—in a different context
—“voters’ ignorance of politicians’ behavior is not exclusively a func-
tion of their negligible incentive to obtain such information .... It is
also a function of the cost of obtaining the relevant information,
which may be prohibitive even for [those] who have a much higher
benefit of obtaining this information.”189 Unlike special interest
groups that represent industries, activist groups typically have
relatively limited financial resources.190 Furthermore, due to the
prevalence of legislative practices such as omnibus legislation,
monitoring procedural rule violations may require particularly high
monitoring costs.191 
The combination of monitoring costs, limited financial resources,
and narrow policy interests inevitably means that activist groups
are likely to focus their resources on monitoring legislators’ policy
votes, and in only a limited set of policy areas.192 It is therefore
unlikely that activist groups will spend their scarce monitoring
resources on detecting violations of procedural rules in the legisla-
tive process.
Special interest groups representing corporate business inter-
ests, for example, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America,193 tend to have greater resources to monitor legislators’
behavior, but are also unlikely to solve the monitoring problems
of individual groups to achieve their political and policy goals.” See Evans, Politics of
Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 516.
188. See Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 494-516; see also
Center for Responsive Politics, Mission, http://www.opensecrets.org/about/index.php (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010); Common Cause, About Common Cause, http://www.commoncause.
org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4764181 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
189. Leeson, supra note 132, at 363.
190. Snyder & Ting, supra note 183, at 483.
191. See supra Part II.B; see also Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 123, at 1300.
192. Given that good-government groups, such as Common Cause, the Center for
Responsive Politics, and Taxpayers for Common Sense, often focus on money in politics, it is
possible that other types of congressional rules, such as budgetary rules and some ethics
rules, attract somewhat higher activist-group monitoring.
193. See Snyder & Ting, supra note 183, at 483.
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regarding rules governing lawmaking. On the contrary, such special
interest groups are more likely to favor less transparency and
electoral accountability in the legislative process.194 Indeed, to the
extent that reelection-minded legislators need to cater to the de-
mands of these interest groups,195 this circumstance creates a
powerful incentive to engage in procedural rule violations. In fact,
a number of case studies and significant anecdotal evidence suggest
that rent-seeking interest groups are often the primary beneficiaries
of stealth legislation and irregularities in the legislative process.196 
To be sure, the extent to which interest groups dominate the
legislative process, and the extent to which activist groups and
special interest groups may cancel each other out, are matters of
intense debate in the political science and political economy liter-
ature.197 This Article expresses no opinion on this larger question.
Rather, it argues that, in the context of the rules regulating law-
making, interest groups are generally more likely to create an
incentive to violate rules than to solve monitoring problems and
induce rule following.198
194. See Block-Lieb, supra note 129, at 825-27 (discussing the aspects of the legislative
process, such as omnibus legislation, that serve the interests of special interest groups);
Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 494, 516 (noting that special
interest groups have been major opponents to congressional reforms in areas such as
committee jurisdiction).
195. See Block-Lieb, supra note 129, at 824, 831-32.
196. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 217-18 (arguing that deviation from “regular
order in Congress creates greater opportunities for parochial, special interest provisions to
be added to legislation out of public view” and providing several examples); see also Seth
Grossman, Tricameral Legislating: Statutory Interpretation in an Era of Conference
Committee Ascendancy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 272-88 (2006); Andrew J.
Schwartzman et al., Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Beware of Intended
Consequences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 582-84 (2006); Charles Tiefer, How To Steal a Trillion:
The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 442-47 (2001); Victor
Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: Ensuring Minimal
Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367, 368-
69 (2004); Reynolds, supra note 20, at 508-09, 513-14, 518-19; E. Bolstad, Earmark Tampering
Suggested, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2007, at B1.
197. For overviews of these debates, see, for example, FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 126,
at 17-33; Block-Lieb, supra note 129, at 819-27, 830-38; Shaviro, supra note 134, at 42-45, 55-
56, 87-92.
198. Cf. Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 516 (concluding that,
for the most part, the interest-group community has been an impediment to congressional
reforms).
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C. Policy Motivations
Advocates of greater trust in Congress’s aptitude to act as a
responsible constitutional decision maker often base their claim
primarily on legislators’ incentive to pursue good public policy.199
This Article accepts the argument that legislators’ policy motiva-
tions have an important impact on congressional decision making.200
It argues, however, that at least in the lawmaking rules context,
this incentive is more likely to produce rule violations than rule
following.
Legislators’ motivation to create policy is derived from a wide
range of personal goals.201 In addition to ideology and a desire to
make good public policy, the motivation to create policy is also
induced by a desire to be an influential policymaker, to exhibit
institutional power and increase one’s prestige, to claim credit and
satisfy constituents, and to attract financial support from interest
groups.202 All these interests combine into a powerful incentive to
create policy and to pass legislation.203 The question, therefore, is
how this strong incentive interacts with lawmaking rules.
Research by political scientists suggests that lawmaking rules
can significantly impact policy outcomes.204 There is evidence,
moreover, that members of Congress themselves are well aware of
the important impact of legislative rules on legislative outcomes.205
Representative John Dingell, the longest-serving member of the
199. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 123, at 65-66; Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 123, at
1288; Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294-96.
200. See Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers,
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 361-62 (2001); Shaviro, supra note 134, at 82, 85-86.
201. Martin, supra note 200, at 362.
202. Edward B. Hasecke & Jason D. Mycoff, Party Loyalty and Legislative Success: Are
Loyal Majority Party Members More Successful in the U.S. House of Representatives?, 60 POL.
RES. Q. 607, 607, 609 (2007); Martin, supra note 200, at 362; Shaviro, supra note 134, at 85-
86, 93-94; Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 294-96.
203. See sources cited supra note 202.
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. Cox, supra note 36, at 183-84; see also Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules, supra
note 18, at 397 (“Legislators realize that voting rules and other procedural details determine
outcomes, and that is why they wrangle over such matters so fiercely, much to the
befuddlement of outsiders.”); Theriault, supra note 177, at 11 (“Party leaders, who are
primarily concerned with the outcome of a substantive vote, establish the best possible set of
procedures to arrive at their preferred substantive outcome. The leaders use procedure to
hardwire the final outcome.”).
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House, has expressed—albeit in a slightly different context—a
cognizance about the impact of procedures perhaps most bluntly:
“I’ll let you write the substance ... and you let me write the proce-
dure, and I’ll screw you every time.”206 Indeed, scholarship on
congressional design of lawmaking rules suggests that “[w]hen
lawmakers make decisions between rule alternatives, they typically
consider the implications for policy.”207 Empirical research confirms,
moreover, that the majority party indeed uses lawmaking rules,
such as rules that restrict adding amendments during floor debate,
to achieve more favorable policy outcomes, and that this strategy is
often successful.208
The combination of the factors discussed thus far—legislators’
strong incentive to pass policy, the significant impact of lawmaking
rules on policy outcomes, and legislators’ knowledge of this
impact—leads to the conclusion that policy incentives should have
considerable influence on Congress’s enforcement of these rules.
When it comes to the lawmaking rules that constrain the legislative
process, which by their very nature limit legislators’ ability to
translate their policy preferences into legislation, the impact of
policy motivations is clear: they create a strong incentive to deviate
from the rules.209
Descriptive congressional scholarship suggests that this impact
of policy interests on rule following may be particularly strong in
the modern Congress.210 As some congressional scholars suggest, in
a different context, with “the ever-growing ideological polarization
in Congress[,] [m]ore than ever before, lawmakers may have hard-
and-fast views about the rightness of their policy agenda. The
206. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983)
(statement of Rep. John Dingell) (discussing the impact of procedures imposed on agencies).
207. SCHICKLER, supra note 127, at 10, 261-63 (finding that policy considerations impact
Congress’s decisions about designing and altering formal procedural rules); C. Lawrence
Evans, Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 605,
605, 627 (1999) [hereinafter Evans, Legislative Structure].
208. See generally Monroe & Robinson, supra note 37.
209. Cf. McKelvey & Ordeshook, supra note 121, at 201 (“[I]nstitutions and rules ... are
designed to attain some preferred set of outcomes. And, when such outcomes cannot be
attained under them and when some set of persons possesses the appropriate means, those
institutions and rules will either be modified or bypassed.”).
210. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 7.
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question of whether their policy agenda is constitutional may matter
less to today’s lawmakers.”211
Even more germane for present purposes is congressional
scholars Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein’s observation that
“[s]harp partisan differences on policy created an atmosphere [in
Congress, and especially in the House,] in which the legislative ends
could justify any procedural means,”212 and in which procedural
values are viewed as “impediments to the larger goal of achieving
political and policy success.”213 
In short, legislators’ policy goals—even if they originate from
purely ideological and public-regarding motivations—produce a
strong incentive to violate lawmaking rules when such rules stand
in the way of their policy preferences.214 Notwithstanding the
central impact of policy motivations on rule following, however, Part
III.D argues that other powerful forces both exacerbate and
complicate the influence of legislators’ policy motivations.
D. Parties and Leaders
Some scholars argue that the most promising enforcers of the
rules that govern lawmaking are the majority party and its
leaders.215 This Article accepts the claim that political parties are a
powerful force in Congress, especially in the House,216 and that
parties have an impact both on congressional decision making217 and
211. Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971-
2000, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 11, at 396, 408 (suggesting that this may
be one explanation for the steady decline in the number of constitutional hearings by all
congressional committees but the judiciary committees).
212. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 7.
213. Id. at 170-71.
214. McKelvey & Ordeshook, supra note 121, at 201.
215. Cox, supra note 36, at 172 (“If party leaders can expel members from legislative
caucuses, deny them renomination, or deny them future office opportunities, then the majority
party (or coalition) may be able externally to enforce a given set of rules.”); Philip Norton,
Playing by the Rules: The Constraining Hand of Parliamentary Procedure, 7 J. LEGIS. STUD.
13, 29 (2001) (making a similar argument regarding the British parliament and noting that
“[w]hen Labour MPs have appeared to challenge or, worse still, disobey the rules of the
House, they have been slapped down by their leaders”).
216. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 281 & n.263 (2000) (arguing that “the consensus today
is that parties ... have, in fact, come back strong”).
217. For more on the political science scholarship about the effects of parties on
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on congressional design of procedural rules.218 It also agrees that
party leaders have significant tools to enforce party discipline and
to influence members’ behavior,219 and that this influence is
particularly evident in members’ procedural votes.220 This Article
concedes, therefore, that party leaders can potentially induce
compliance with lawmaking rules even when rules conflict with
individual legislators’ policy preferences.221 Furthermore, as
explained in Part II, the chambers’ presiding officers, who are
always members of the majority party, have a crucial role both in
the application—or violation—of the rules and in Congress’s
enforcement mechanisms.222 Thus, the majority party leaders in
Congress, especially in the House, are arguably the most influential
figures in determining Congress’s compliance with lawmaking rules.
The question, however, is how parties and their leaders use this
power. 
Just like individual legislators, congressional parties also pursue
multiple goals.223 These include passing items on the party’s agenda,
helping members accomplish individual goals, achieving and
maintaining majority status, and enhancing the party’s image.224 All
congressional decision making, see, for example, Cary R. Covington & Andrew A. Bargen,
Comparing Floor-Dominated and Party-Dominated Explanations of Policy Change in the
House of Representatives, 66 J. POL. 1069, 1074, 1084-85 (2004); Cox, supra note 36, at 180-82;
Steven S. Smith, Positive Theories of Congressional Parties, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 193, 199
(2000).
218. See, e.g., Evans, Legislative Structure, supra note 207, at 631-32; Evans, Politics of
Legislative Reform, supra note 127, at 494, 508-11, 516. But cf. SCHICKLER, supra note 127,
at 25, 259-61, 263 (conceding that, since the 1970s, party interests returned to prominence,
but arguing that the importance of partisan interests to institutional design is greater in the
House than in the Senate and that “even when majority party interests are important, these
interests are rarely alone”); Sarah A. Binder, Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited, 31
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 513, 514 (2006) (suggesting that, “while it is premature to reject party-based
accounts of procedural change, no single account best explains the politics of institutional
change”).
219. See Hasecke & Mycoff, supra note 202, at 609-10; William Hixon & Bryan W.
Marshall, Agendas, Side Issues, and Leadership in the US House, 19 J. THEORETICAL POL. 83,
83-84, 85-88 (2007); Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 10-12.
220. See Cox, supra note 36, at 183-84; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12;
Theriault, supra note 177, at 16.
221. See Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12; Theriault, supra note 177, at
16.
222. Hartog & Monroe, supra note 59, at 2 (noting that “in the modern House and Senate,
the Presiding Officer is always a member of the majority party”).
223. See Hasecke & Mycoff, supra note 202, at 609.
224. Id.
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of these goals lead to a powerful motivation to pass legislation. In
addition to the obvious collective party goal of passing the party
agenda, rank-and-file members often pressure their leaders to enact
legislation because it serves their personal policy and reelection
goals.225 The party goals of maintaining majority status and
enhancing party image also depend, to a significant extent, upon the
party’s success in enacting the legislative program on which it was
elected and on fostering a distinct “party label” in terms of the
policies for which the party stands.226
The combination of these goals creates strong pressures on
majority party leaders to pass legislation and to push through the
party’s legislative agenda.227 These pressures result not only from
incentives that parties create to induce their leaders to internalize
the collective goals of the party,228 but also from party leaders’
personal goals.229 Although legislative leaders have the same per-
sonal goals that motivate other legislators, the desire for power and
prestige tend to be particularly pronounced in congressional and
party leaders.230 Much more than in the case of rank-and-file mem-
bers, legislative leaders’ personal prestige often hinges on winning
legislative victories.231 These leaders’ goal to appear effective and
successful in passing the party policy agenda creates a strong
incentive to pass legislation, which often overshadows other consid-
erations.232 
225. John E. Owens & J. Mark Wrighton, Procedural Control and Majority Party
Entrenchment in the U.S. House: An Explanation of Rules Restrictiveness Over Time 11 (Apr.
12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/csd_owens_
MPSA07_19Mar07.pdf.
226. Id.; see also Cox, supra note 36, at 187-88.
227. Owens & Wrighton, supra note 225, at 11.
228. Cf. SCHICKLER, supra note 127, at 10 (noting that parties create “leadership posts that
are both attractive and elective, thereby inducing [their] leaders ‘to internalize the collective
electoral fate of the party’” (quoting GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 132-33 (1993))).
229. Shaviro, supra note 134, at 83-84.
230. Id. at 102 (“Congressional leaders, including both party leaders and committee
chairpersons, face stronger prestige ... incentives than rank and file members.”).
231. Id. at 83-84.
232. Id. (arguing, for example, that “Wilbur Mills, the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee from 1958 to 1974, who never lost a tax bill on the House floor, seemingly
regarded his ‘aura of invincibility’ as more important than the content of legislation”).
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Majority party leaders have several tools to secure the passage
of their party’s legislative agenda,233 but a chief tool, particularly
in the House, is the party leaders’ control over legislative pro-
cedures.234 As John Owens and Mark Wrighton put it:
[M]ajority parties have well-earned reputations for crafting rules
designed to protect their legislative agendas on the floor.
Majority leaders can manipulate the consideration of legislation
in any way that a majority of votes on the floor will support, and
they have become very creative in writing rules that protect
elements of their legislative agenda and/or provide cover for
caucus members.235
Indeed, significant literature on congressional parties documents
the means by which majority parties and their leaders manipulate
procedural rules to facilitate the passage of their party’s agenda.236 
Legislative leaders can also advance the majority party’s agenda
through the enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of legislative
rules.237 Decisions about the enforcement of lawmaking rules in the
House appear to be particularly influenced by partisan consider-
ations. Recent empirical research suggests that, in the House,
“perhaps without exception, the chair rules [on points of order] in a
way favored by the majority party,” and that in the relatively few
cases in which the Chair’s rulings are appealed, the majority party
always prevails.238 Furthermore, points of order—Congress’s chief
233. See Hixon & Marshall, supra note 219, at 85.
234. Id. at 85-86.
235. Owens & Wrighton, supra note 225, at 9.
236. Cox, supra note 36, at 180; Hixon & Marshall, supra note 219, at 85-86; Monroe &
Robinson, supra note 37, at 217-20; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 12.
237. Hartog & Monroe, supra note 59, at 1-2 (arguing that “Presiding Officers’ rulings [on
points of order] in the House and Senate ... can play an important role in both chambers’
legislative processes, sometimes having major impacts on legislative outcomes,” and that “in
both chambers, chairs’ rulings have important implications for parties’ agendas”).
238. Id. at 12. Partisan influence on the Chair’s enforcement of procedural rules in the
Senate is less clear. Compare, e.g., id. at 2 (suggesting that “substantial partisanship is also
at play in Senate chair’s rulings”), with Michael S. Lynch & Tony Madonna, The Vice
President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design 29 (Jan.
25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ajmadonn.myweb.uga.edu/
VicePresident.pdf (finding that “[i]n the post-parliamentarian era, senators [serving in the
Chair] were likely to issue favorable rulings to majority party members 73.6 percent of the
time.... [T]he predicted probability of the vice president issuing a favorable ruling to the
majority party was [roughly 60] percent”), and Anthony J. Madonna, Informational
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enforcement mechanism for lawmaking rules—are often waived in
the House by special rules written by the Rules Committee.239 Since
the 1970s, the Rules Committee has increasingly served as an
“agent” of the majority party,240 including granting waivers that
circumvent House rules in order to serve the majority party’s policy
agenda.241 These special rules are typically approved on the floor “on
a strictly party line vote.”242 
Legislative leaders have strong incentives to enforce the types of
rules, such as restrictive rules, that serve the majority party’s policy
and political interests, and they often succeed in doing so.243 In this
regard, scholars who argue that majority party leaders can ensure
compliance with lawmaking rules are correct.244 At the same time,
however, these scholars seem to overlook the fact that party leaders
also have considerable power and incentives to violate rules that
impede the passage of the majority party’s agenda.245 In fact, the
same incentives that make party leaders vigorously enforce rules
that serve their party’s interests become powerful incentives to
violate rules that stand in the way of party interests.
The 2003 Medicare Bill is a clear example. This bill was the major
social policy initiative of President Bush,246 and Republican leaders
in Congress “hoped that adoption of the measure would reduce or
even neutralize the long-term Democratic advantage on health
Asymmetries, the Parliamentarian, and Unorthodox Procedural Choice in the United States
Senate 2, 19 (Mar. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ajmadonn.myweb.
uga.edu/Parliamentarian.pdf (arguing that the emergence of the Senate’s parliamentarian
in the 1920s decreased the impact of partisanship in presiding officers’ rulings).
239. See MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 108-09.
240. Id. at 49-59, 77-82, 118-21.
241. Id. at 108-09, 112-14, 121.
242. Monroe & Robinson, supra note 37, at 218-19.
243. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 36, at 187 (“Typically, the effect of rules is most visible in
conjunction with a majority party or coalition’s efforts to push through its legislative agenda
against opposition.”).
244. See id. at 172.
245. Theoretically, party leaders may have an incentive to enforce procedural rules, even
when these rules do not facilitate the passage of the majority party’s agenda, if they believe
that procedural violations will jeopardize the party image and risk their chances of
maintaining majority status. See Norton, supra note 215, at 21-22 (providing anecdotal
evidence from England). As Part III.A already established, however, because most procedural
violations are relatively insulated from electoral accountability, it is unlikely that fear from
voters’ punishment can override the powerful motivation to pass the party’s agenda.
246. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 1.
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issues with the public.”247 Passing this bill was therefore a top
priority for the majority party and its leaders.248 Consequently, they
employed a variety of more or less legitimate strategies to pass the
bill, including exclusion of minority party members from the House-
Senate conference committee and insertion of major provisions that
were rejected during earlier floor debates into the conference
report.249 There were even allegations that the majority party
leaders tried to secure the necessary votes for passing this bill
through threats and bribes.250 Finally, as Part II.D elaborated, when
following the established norm that limits votes to fifteen minutes
would have meant defeat of the bill, House leaders simply, and
blatantly, breached it.251 
As the DRA example from Part II.C suggests, moreover, party
interests may create strong incentives to violate even constitutional
rules when compliance would mean defeat of a bill that is important
to the majority party.252 The DRA’s passage was highly conten-
tious.253 It passed the Senate through Vice President Cheney’s tie-
breaking vote254 and the House by a 216-214 vote through heavy
pressure by majority party leaders.255 Hence, when it was discovered
that the bill did not pass both chambers in the same form, majority
party leaders did not want to take the chance that the bill would not
pass another vote in the House.256 Instead, the legislative leaders
simply ignored the constitutional bicameralism requirement and
signed the enrolled bill in attestation that the bill had duly passed
both houses, despite their knowledge that the bill was never passed
in identical form by both chambers.257
Admittedly, the instances of both the DRA and the Medicare Bill
occurred during Republican control of Congress, but significant
247. Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 11.
248. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 1.
249. See id. at 1-4, 6, 137-38; Houck, supra note 105, at 11-12.
250. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 1-4, 6.
251. See id. at 1-4; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 11-12; see also supra
Part II.D.
252. See supra Part II.C.
253. See Michael Gilfix & Bernard A. Krooks, Asset Preservation and Long-Term Care:
Assault in the Name of Deficit Reduction, 20 PROB. & PROP. 34, 34 (2006).
254. DEAN, supra note 89, at 51.
255. Id. at 52.
256. Id. at 52-53.
257. See id.; supra Part II.C.
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evidence confirms that the procedural “maneuvering behind the
Medicare ... legislation was neither unique to [this bill] nor to the
108th Congress,”258 and that since the 1980s both parties have been
increasingly guilty of deviations from lawmaking rules and process
abuses when they controlled Congress.259 Indeed, the recent history
of Congress suggests that “the inclination to pass bills important to
the majority party quickly trumps previous assurances of openness
and fairness made by the incoming majority.”260 
E. Institutional Rivalry and Institutional Interests
The assumption about institutional competition and institutional
interests is illustrated by the government’s argument in United
States v. Munoz-Flores. In that case, the government argued that
courts should not review Origination Clause261 challenges because
“the House has the power to protect its institutional interests by
refusing to pass a bill if it believes that the Origination Clause has
been violated.”262 Although the full Court did not embrace this posi-
tion,263 this argument was essentially accepted by Justice Stevens
in his concurring opinion. Justice Stevens opined that “the House is
258. Houck, supra note 105, at 14.
259. For a detailed account, see MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 7-9, 67-95, 100-07,
169-75, 212-16, 253-62 (detailing process abuses by both parties between the late 1980s and
2008). For more on process abuses by the Democratic majority that controlled Congress in the
early 1990s, see Kimberly Coursen et al., Restoring Faith in Congress, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 249, 263-64, 266, 269-70 (1993); Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The
Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 321, 321-22, 349, 351-63 (1994). For more on process abuses by the Republican
majority that controlled Congress between 1994 and 2006, see HOUSE RULES COMM. MINORITY
OFFICE, 108TH CONG., BROKEN PROMISES: THE DEATH OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: A
CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON THE UNPRECEDENTED EROSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN
THE 108TH CONGRESS 1-2 (2005), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050511221002/
http://www.democrats.house.gov/docs/brokenpromises.pdf; Sinclair, Congress Deliberates and
Legislates, supra note 50, at 55-56, 59-67, 72, 75-76. Finally, for more on process abuses by
the Democratic majority that controlled Congress from 2007 to 2010, see Committee on Rules-
Republicans, http://rules-republicans.house.gov/ShortTopics/Default.aspx?id=1 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010) (website of the minority members of the House Rules Committee that details
the majority’s procedural abuses).
260. Owens & Wrighton, supra note 225, at 11. 
261. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives.”).
262. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 392 (1990).
263. Id. at 401.
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in an excellent position to defend its origination power,”264 and that
“there is every reason to anticipate that Representatives ... will
jealously guard [this] power.”265 While acknowledging that “the
House has an interest in upholding the entire Constitution, not just
those provisions that protect its institutional prerogatives,” Justice
Stevens added that “even if the House should mistake its constitu-
tional interest generally, it is unlikely to mistake its more particular
interest in being powerful.”266
Justice Stevens’s concurrence was carefully limited to only the
Origination Clause and did not address other lawmaking require-
ments.267 However, some opponents of judicial review of the legis-
lative process argue that the assumption that institutional rivalry
provides Congress sufficient incentives to police itself applies to
most other constitutional and nonconstitutional lawmaking rules as
well.268 Jesse Choper, for example, argues that lawmaking rules
“ordinarily concern protections for one house of Congress,” and that
the Senate and House have sufficient incentives to protect their
interests against each other.269 
Part III.E argues, however, that institutional interests and
institutional rivalry are not an effective mechanism to ensure rule
following in the legislative process. First, while the Origination
Clause and bicameralism requirement indeed implicate the House’s
prerogatives vis-à-vis the Senate, many other rules have no bearing
on the division of powers between the two chambers. The violation
of rules such as voting and quorum and the three-reading require-
264. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 404.
266. Id. at 404 n.2 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Stevens agreed with the Court
that “the possibility of legislative enforcement does not supply a prudential, nonconstitutional
justification for abstaining from constitutional interpretation,” but argued that “this
possibility is relevant to the substantive task of interpreting § 7 itself.” Id.
267. Id. at 404, 406. Interestingly, in many of his other decisions Justice Stevens has been
“the most ardent proponent of a ‘due process of lawmaking’ philosophy” in the Court. Dan T.
Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional
Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1286, 1385 (2002); see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
757 n.23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-554 &
nn.24 & 26-28 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 189-90 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 97-98 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldfeld, supra note 196, at 405-08.
268. Choper, supra note 7, at 1505-07.
269. Id.
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ment in one chamber does not impact the prerogatives and institu-
tional interests of the other chamber. Hence institutional rivalry
cannot ensure compliance with these rules. 
The major problem with the institutional rivalry argument,
however, is that it too often treats legislative chambers as an “it”
rather than a “they.”270 The argument assumes that the Senate and
the House each act as a “personified rational actor,” rather than a
large multi-member body, whose members’ interests “often, and
perhaps systematically,” diverge from their chamber’s institutional
interests.271 
To be sure, institutional concerns sometimes do converge with
individual legislators’ interests.272 A motivation that may potentially
reinforce legislators’ interest in protecting their chamber’s institu-
tional prerogatives is their interest in personal power and prestige.
This Article does not dispute that personal power is an important
goal for legislators;273 nor does it deny that legislators’ interest in
greater personal influence and prestige may theoretically translate
into an interest in belonging to a stronger, more influential legis-
lative chamber. 
The problem, however, is that although all of the 435
Representatives and 100 Senators have some stake in their cham-
ber’s institutional standing, they also have more direct and powerful
personal interests that are often in conflict with their institutional
270. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 239 (1992).
271. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991,
1034-35 (2008) (making this claim in a slightly different context and noting that “this is a
standard assumption in constitutional theory”). To be fair, Justice Stevens did relate his
argument to legislators’ personal interests, noting that taxes “rarely go unnoticed at the ballot
box,” and therefore assuming that “Representatives subject to reelection every two years will
jealously guard their power over revenue-raising measures.” Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 404.
However, this Section argues that reelection motivations—and other legislators’ motivations
—are more likely to conflict with institutional interests than reinforce them. Moreover, even
if Justice Stevens is correct that taxes are the exception to voters’ general ignorance and
indifference, his argument applies only to the Origination Clause.
272. See Devins, supra note 159, at 398, 404, 413-14 (arguing that the Watergate era was
a rare exception in which “members of Congress gained personal advantage by standing up
for legislative prerogatives,” because “[v]oters wanted Congress to check a too powerful
President—to prevent future Watergates and Viet Nams,” but that today “members of
Congress see little personal gain” in defending Congress’s institutional turf).
273. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 134, at 82.
852 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:805
interests.274 Motivations, such as pursuing policy and reelection,
often conflict with institutional interests.275 Because it is unlikely
that voters reward legislators for aggressively protecting their
chamber’s power vis-à-vis the other chamber,276 legislators are
unlikely to block the passage of a law that advances their, or their
constituents’, interests in order to defend their chamber’s preroga-
tives.277
Furthermore, legislators have powerful incentives to prefer party
loyalty over institutional loyalty because parties significantly
impact legislators’ ability to pursue their personal goals. Due to
party leaders’ control over the legislative agenda, parties are
particularly instrumental to lawmakers’ ability to pursue their
policy goals, and there is evidence that party leaders do in fact
schedule members’ bills to reward party loyalty.278 By providing
campaign funds and other essential campaign resources, parties are
also important for legislators’ reelection, and party leaders use their
influence over these resources as well to ensure party loyalty.279
Furthermore, “in the highly polarized two-party system currently
dominating national politics, a member’s political success depends
274. Devins, supra note 159, at 400; Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 926-32 (2005); cf. Donald L. Davison et al., The
Behavioural Consequences of Institutional Rules: Republicans in the US House, 11 J. LEGIS.
STUD. 38, 43-44 (2005) (asking legislators about their goals and finding that the vast majority
of legislators favor other goals, such as solving national policy problems or servicing their
constituents, over “restoring public confidence in Congress”).
275. Davison et al., supra note 274, at 43-44.
276. If voters today are unlikely to reward lawmakers for defending Congress’s
prerogatives vis-à-vis the President, Devins, supra note 159, at 414, it is even less likely that
voters care about the separation of powers between the two chambers.
277. Cf. id. at 400 (noting that “members of Congress regularly tradeoff their interest in
Congress as an institution for their personal interests—most notably, reelection and
advancing their (and their constituents’) policy agenda”).
278. See Hasecke & Mycoff, supra note 202, at 610, 615; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra
note 135, at 11-12.
279. See Kramer, supra note 216, at 281-82; Evans, Middle Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135,
at 11-12. But cf. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 627-33, 644-47 (2000) (discussing parties’ growing role in funding
campaigns and noting that parties could seek to leverage their funds to induce a legislator to
take certain positions on pending legislative issues, but arguing that “in practice, those who
argue that party money does not present a serious danger of undue party influence over
candidates may be right”).
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more on the fortunes of her particular party than on the stature of
Congress.”280 
Even from the perspective of their personal power and prestige
goals, lawmakers have a strong motivation to prefer party loyalty
over institutional loyalty. Legislators’ personal power goals are more
directly, and more often, translated into a personal interest in
committee assignments and leadership positions in their chamber
than into concerns about their chamber’s power.281 In the modern
Congress, assignments to committees and to committee leadership
positions are very much controlled by party leaders, who use party
loyalty as a major assignment criterion.282 Finally, as Part III.D
established and as the DRA case illustrates, even chamber leaders
have strong incentives to prefer party loyalty over protecting their
chamber’s prerogatives. All this leads to the conclusion that “party
loyalty [often] trumps institutional concerns.”283
Indeed, in addition to individual legislators’ interests, parties and
partisan interests also complicate and undermine the institutional
rivalry argument. As Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes argue—in
a slightly different context, “[i]ntraparty cooperation ... smoothes
over branch boundaries.”284 This, in turn, suppresses “the political
dynamics that were supposed to provide each branch with a ‘will of
its own,’” and undermines the Madisonian assumption that depart-
mental “[a]mbition [will] counteract ambition.”285 The exceptionally
280. William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and
Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2008).
281. Levinson, supra note 274, at 927-29. On legislators’ strong interest in committee
assignments, see Davison et al., supra note 274, at 42 (presenting results of a survey finding
that members from both parties see their specific committee and subcommittee assignments
as important instruments that enable them to achieve their personal goals, and wish to be
either the chair or ranking member on a committee in order to advance their goals); Elizabeth
Garrett, Preferences, Laws, and Default Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2104, 2118-19 (2009) (book
review) (“Members of Congress vie for assignments to committees with jurisdiction over policy
in which they take a strong interest, either because of personal preferences, constituent
interests, the potential for influence within the legislature, or some combination.”).
282. Cox, supra note 36, at 181; Hasecke & Mycoff, supra note 202, at 610; Evans, Middle
Doesn’t Rule, supra note 135, at 11-12.
283. Marshall, supra note 280, at 518.
284. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2329 (2006).
285. Id. at 2313 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kramer, supra note 216, at
268-87 (similarly arguing that party cooperation transcends federal-state institutional
boundaries, and that this undermines the traditional “political safeguards of federalism”
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strong, cohesive, and polarized parties of the modern Congress
make the likelihood of cross-chamber, intra-party cooperation that
undermines chamber rivalry even more likely, at least when both
chambers are controlled by the same party.286 Furthermore, even
under a divided government, the sharp partisan polarization in
Congress makes intra-chamber bipartisan cooperation, which is
often necessary to assert the chamber’s prerogatives vis-à-vis other
government branches, much less likely.287
Admittedly, not everyone agrees with Levinson and Pildes’s
strong claim that the current American system of separation of
powers is more properly characterized as “separation of parties, not
powers,”288 or with Neal Devins’s even bolder conclusion that “[f]or
those who embrace a constitutional design in which ... ‘ambition
must be made to counteract ambition,’ today’s system of checks and
balances is an abject failure.”289 However, there is strong support in
the congressional scholarship at least to the more modest claim that
legislators’ willingness to protect their institutional prerogatives is
relatively weak in the modern Congress,290 and that institutional
interests “usually play second fiddle to more parochial goals, that is,
assumption); Fabrice E. Lehoucq, Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and
Democratization, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2002) (similarly arguing, in the electoral
governance context, “that the classical theory” about separating powers between the executive
and the legislature “breaks down when the same party controls the executive and the
legislature”).
286. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 284, at 2315-16, 2332-38.
287. Devins, supra note 159, at 406-15.
288. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 284, at 2311, 2315-16, 2329.
289. Devins, supra note 159, at 415; see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 271, at 1035-36
(agreeing that “the separation of powers system functions differently in times of unified or
divided government,” but arguing that “it goes too far to claim that the American
constitutional system displays ‘separation of parties, not powers’; rather, it displays both
separation of powers and parties in a complicated interaction”); Richard A. Epstein, Why
Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV.
L. REV. F. 210, 210, 213 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/epstein.pdf 
(conceding that “[i]t is futile to argue that political parties do not influence relations between
the legislative and executive branches” and that “[t]he greater the political cohesion, the less
critical separation of powers becomes,” but arguing that “Professors Levinson and Pildes have
too much faith that party unity renders structural obstacles unimportant”).
290. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at xi-xii, 146-49, 215; Devins, supra note 159,
at 408-15; Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 931, 931-32 (1999); Levinson, supra note 274, at 926-32, 951-59; Marshall, supra note
280, at 518-19, 521; Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers into Practice:
Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 43-52 (2007).
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to partisanship or the narrow interests of particular members and
constituencies.”291 
In short, whenever the passage of a bill serves legislators’
individual or party interests, it is unlikely that institutional inter-
ests and institutional rivalry are sufficiently strong to ensure rule
following in the congressional legislative process. Furthermore, as
Part III.F argues, some institutional rivalry—namely, of Congress
vis-à-vis the President—may in fact create an incentive to violate
lawmaking rules.
F. Presidential Veto Power
While this Article focuses on Congress, the President also has the
potential power to enforce the law of congressional lawmaking. At
least as far as the constitutional rules are concerned, the President
arguably has a duty to refuse to sign bills that were enacted in
violation of these rules.292 Hence, Part III.F examines whether fear
of a presidential veto might serve as a potential motivation for
legislators to avoid procedural rule violations. It argues that the
presidential veto power is unlikely to induce congressional rule
following, and may in fact have the opposite effect in certain
circumstances.
Presidential enforcement of lawmaking rules rests on a single,
crude enforcement mechanism: the President’s power to veto the
bill. This enforcement mechanism is contingent upon the President’s
ability to detect the rule violation before signing the bill and on the
President’s willingness to veto an entire bill merely for procedural
violations in its enactment process. Both of these conditions for
presidential enforcement can be easily manipulated by Congress.
First, by enacting massive omnibus bills through expedited pro-
cedures, legislators can significantly reduce the President’s capacity
to detect violations in the legislative process. This possibility is
291. Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 494, 511, 516.
292. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892). But cf. Cass & Strauss, supra note 81, at
21-25 (arguing, in a different context, that the President is not obliged to veto legislation that
has one or two provisions he believes to be unconstitutional, and that the President falls short
of his obligation to the Constitution only when he “signs a law that he believes, in its core
provisions, so fundamentally violates the Constitution that he cannot with a straight face
declare its constitutional merits outweigh its flaws”).
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clearly illustrated by the Farm Bill example in which the President
failed to notice that the bill presented to him was missing an entire
34-page section.293
Second, as the DRA example illustrates, even when the President
is well aware of the procedural rule violation, the President may
lack the will to use her veto power to ensure compliance with
lawmaking rules.294 As long as the bill’s content serves the Presi-
dent’s policy and political interests, it is unlikely that the President
will choose to veto a bill merely for procedural violations.295
Scholarship about presidential vetoes suggests that while a variety
of factors influence Presidents’ veto decisions, one of the most
important is the extent to which the President finds the legislation’s
content objectionable.296 As one empirical study found, “[t]o a
substantial degree, presidential vetoes are a direct and predictable
consequence of congressional behavior and of the kind of legislation
Congress passes.”297 Thus, by making the content of legislation more
attractive to the President, legislators can undercut the President’s
will to enforce procedural lawmaking rules.298 
Furthermore, even if legislators fail to undermine the President’s
capacity or will to enforce lawmaking rules, the impact of presiden-
tial enforcement is also limited by the congressional power to
override the President’s veto by a supermajority vote.299 
It appears, therefore, that the presidential veto power is not likely
to create a significant incentive for legislators to avoid procedural
rule violations. Instead, the existence of the presidential veto power
may motivate legislators to create legislative practices that under-
mine the President’s ability to veto their preferred legislation,
whether on content or procedural grounds. These practices, in turn,
often entail deviating from the rules governing the legislative
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See supra Part II.C.
295. Gersen & Posner, supra note 15, at 579.
296. John B. Gilmour, Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto, 64
J. POL. 198, 202, 212, 216 (2002).
297. Id. at 212.
298. Gersen & Posner, supra note 15, at 579 (“[E]ven if the President were (somehow) fifty
percent more likely to veto legislation that failed to satisfy relevant [lawmaking] rules,
Congress could simply adjust the content of legislation to make it more attractive to the
President.”).
299. Id.
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process.300 A prime example is lawmakers’ “propensity” for inserting
nongermane, substantive riders into omnibus appropriations bills,301
despite the long-standing rules that prohibit attaching such
provisions to appropriations bills.302 Because a presidential veto of
omnibus appropriation bills poses “the specter of government
shutdown,” and is therefore much less likely, legislators have long
been using nongermane riders as a means to circumvent the
President’s power to veto objectionable legislation.303 Hence, the
desire to avoid a presidential veto may actually create an incentive
to violate lawmaking rules.
G. Ethical and Noninstrumental Motivations
Parts III.A-F focused mainly on instrumental or goal-seeking
motivations; however, some scholars argue that legislators’
“willingness to play by the rules also has an ethical underpinning”
because legislators “are constrained by a belief system as well as by
a purely rational assessment of political cost.”304 Others have
suggested that internalization is an additional noninstrumental
force that may potentially influence legislators’ compliance with
rules.305 The argument is that, over the course of time, some legal
constraints become so internalized that “the necessity of enforce-
ment may, except to guard against outliers, disappear.”306 A related
noninstrumental force mentioned in the scholarship is canonization.
A certain text becomes canonical when the relevant community—in
this case, the legislature—has “a certain positive and reverential
300. Cf. Cass & Strauss, supra note 81, at 22 (“The practical political reality is that
Congress, ignoring common precepts like ‘single subject’ rules, frequently deploys statutory
complexity as a weapon against the veto.”).
301. Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto: A Case
for the Item Veto, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 583, 584 (1991).
302. Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations
Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 505-06 (1997).
303. Krasnow, supra note 301, at 584, 597, 606, 612; Zellmer, supra note 302, at 527; see
also J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and
Kurland, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 449 (1990) (“Legislators often incorporate nongermane bills
into larger legislative proposals, knowing that the impracticality of vetoing the entire bill may
ensure that nongermane provisions become law.”).
304. Norton, supra note 215, at 29.
305. Schauer, supra note 45, at 475.
306. Id. at 475 & n.22.
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attitude toward that text such that it is largely unthinkable to
imagine its modification or violation.”307
This Article does not deny that ethical and noninstrumental
motivations also influence legislators, and that such considerations
may induce rule following in the legislative process. In fact, this
view finds support in social psychology research on rule following
that argues that people’s compliance with rules is not merely a
function of sanctions and incentives.308 This research suggests that
noninstrumental factors, rooted in social relationships and ethical
judgments, may also induce people to become self-regulatory and to
take responsibility for rule following onto themselves.309 The
question, however, is whether these ethical and noninstrumental
forces are powerful enough to override legislators’ competing
motivations to violate lawmaking rules. 
One problem with noninstrumental forces such as canonization
and internalization is that it is unlikely that most lawmaking rules
reach a degree of internalization and reverence that secures them
from violation temptations. As for canonization, the only lawmaking
rules that may arguably achieve such a sacred status are the
constitutional bicameralism and presentment requirements.310
Internalization also probably occurs only with the most time-
honored rules, such as the constitutional procedural rules or the
filibuster in the Senate.311
In England, for example, arguments about legislators internaliz-
ing the parliamentary rules are based on the fact that parliamen-
tary procedures have been a well-entrenched feature of the British
political system for many centuries.312 For example, England’s three-
reading rule has been considered “an old-established practice” since
the sixteenth century.313 Furthermore, a distinct feature of the
307. Id. at 473.
308. For a good overview of this scholarship, see TYLER, supra note 127, at 269-94.
309. Id. at 270-71.
310. Cf. Schauer, supra note 45, at 473 (suggesting that in the United States, the
Constitution, or at least the First Amendment, might have such a canonized status).
311. Cf. Bach, supra note 3, at 755 (“Senators may be willing to ignore, waive, or violate
most of their rules, but they give up their cherished right to unlimited debate only in return
for certain knowledge of what they are gaining in return. Some rules are more important than
others, and the debate rules are most important of all.”).
312. Norton, supra note 215, at 18-21.
313. Id. at 19. 
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British parliamentary system is that legislators “are socialised into
existing procedures. New entrants to a legislature, as various
studies have shown, undertake a period of apprenticeship and
learning, a process inculcating support for institutional rules.”314
And yet, there is evidence that even in the “mother of parliaments”
the rules are not so internalized as to make them invulnerable to
partisan, ideological, or personal temptations.315 
If this is the case in the British Parliament, it is hard to believe
that the situation is much better in the younger, sharply polarized,
and partisan U.S. Congress. The House, in particular, is currently
characterized, as we have seen, by “an atmosphere in which the
legislative ends could justify any procedural means.”316 In the
Senate as well, when Senators have to decide whether a lawmaking
rule has been violated, “most Senators appear to base their votes
more on policy and political considerations than on a concern for
procedural consistency and regularity.”317
Even the filibuster procedure, which is perhaps the most ven-
erated and internalized of all Senate rules,318 is far from immune to
instrumental considerations.319 One study has found, for example,
that “the votes of Senators on proposals to alter Senate Rule XXII
[the provision specifying cloture requirements for ending filibusters]
are driven by short-term policy considerations, rather than by
314. Id. at 21, 27. 
315. See Donald D. Searing, Rules of the Game in Britain: Can the Politicians Be Trusted?,
76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 239, 240, 255 (1982) (examining the views of more than six hundred
members of Parliament and candidates toward the most fundamental democratic “rules of the
game,” and finding that “politicians’ attitudes towards the rules of the game ... are based on
political values and partisan advantage.... In sum, rules of the game are pushed and pulled
by political forces that shape politicians’ responses to the rules while having the potential to
undermine the politicians’ commitments”). For recent examples of grave violations of
parliamentary rules in the British Parliament, see, for example, Lords Vote To Suspend Two
Peers, BBC NEWS, May 21, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8060003.stm
(reporting a case in which House of Lords members were found to be willing to change laws
in exchange for cash); cf. John F. Burns, Beneath a Scandal, Deeper Furies, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2009, at WK1 (arguing that the recent expense abuses in the House of Commons are only
the tip of the iceberg in the contemporary British Parliament and describing other problems,
including in the legislative process).
316. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 7.
317. Bach, supra note 3, at 741.
318. Id. at 755.
319. See Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, supra note 127, at 510 (arguing that
Senators’ views toward changing the cloture rule to end filibusters are mostly driven by
partisan imperatives and, to a lesser extent, by individual members’ power goals).
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broader principles about the deliberative benefits of extended
debate.”320 
Moreover, as the DRA example from Part II suggests, even the
constitutional bicameralism requirement is vulnerable when the
motivation for violation is sufficiently strong.321 Congress’s repeated
efforts to create lawmaking procedures that circumvent the consti-
tutional bicameralism and presentment requirements, such as the
legislative veto and the line-item veto, also cast doubt as to the ex-
tent that these rules are internalized and canonized in Congress.322
Undeniably, there is a difference between a direct, flagrant violation
of the rules, such as in the DRA example, and a formal statutory
attempt to modify the constitutional structure of the legislative
process, such as in the legislative veto and the line-item veto
cases.323 However, both types of cases illustrate that even the
constitutional lawmaking rules have not achieved a canonized
status in Congress “such that it is largely unthinkable to imagine
[their] modification or violation.”324
Admittedly, adherents to a “functional approach” to separation
of powers may disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the legis-
lative veto and the line-item veto violated the Constitution.325 This
Section’s argument, however, does not depend on one’s position on
whether Chadha and Clinton v. City of New York were correctly
decided,326 or on whether Congress may adopt different constitu-
tional interpretations of Article I, Section 7 than the Court.327 As
320. Evans, Legislative Structure, supra note 207, at 627. 
321. See supra Parts II.C, III.D.
322. For an overview of these and other cases in which Congress tried to circumvent the
constitutional requirements for lawmaking, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as
a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1379-91 (2001).
323. I thank Richard Briffault for this point.
324. Schauer, supra note 45, at 473, 470 & n.9.
325. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing
the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment
on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; see also Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
326. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
327. See Tushnet, Interpretations in Legislatures, supra note 11, at 356-60 (advocating a
non-court-based evaluative standard to examine Congress’s constitutional performance). For
recent reviews of the different academic views on whether Congress may or even must adopt
its own interpretation of the Constitution, see generally Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107
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case studies about the legislative process of the Line Item Veto Act
of 1996 and the enactment process of a pre-Chadha legislative veto
provision suggest, the real problem in these cases was not that
Congress asserted its right to form an independent, informed
constitutional judgment.328 On the contrary, scholars’ main criticism
in both cases was that Congress failed to do so.329 
More importantly for present purposes, the case studies of the
legislative processes in both cases reveal that although Congress
was well aware that the legislative proposal may violate Article I,
Section 7, constitutional concerns were apparently not a decisive
factor in Congress’s decision making.330 Hence, regardless of one’s
view about the legislative veto and the line-item veto, the legislative
process in these cases suggests, at the very least, that constitutional
considerations do not necessarily trump policy and partisan con-
siderations in Congress.331
Although not focusing on procedural rules, Mitchell Pickerill’s
study is also illustrative.332 Based on case studies and on interviews
COLUM. L. REV. 303, 342-52 (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial
Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1579 & n.227, 1580-82 (2007).
328. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of Clinton v. City of New York: Congress Can Take
Care of Itself, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 47, 57-83 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Garrett, Story] (discussing the legislative process of the Line Item Veto Act of
1996); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REV. 587, 593-600 (1983) (discussing the enactment process of a legislative veto
provision in the period between the lower court’s Chadha decision and the Supreme Court’s
Chadha decision).
329. Garrett, Story, supra note 328, at 48-49, 91-98; Mikva, supra note 328, at 597-600; see
also Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern
Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 351, 355-
61 (1997); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-
Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 441-45 (2001).
330. Garrett, Story, supra note 328, at 98 (“[T]he debate [on the Line Item Veto Act] does
not demonstrate that constitutional concerns are the deciding factor in any lawmaker’s vote,
nor do constitutional arguments appear to change the decision that members would [make]
on policy or partisan grounds.”); Mikva, supra note 328, at 600 (“[T]he constitutionality of the
provision was only one factor that was considered in the Senate’s vote on the amendment and
... it may not have been the most important.”). 
331. Supra note 330; cf. Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted?, supra note 11, at 296
(defending the legislative veto as a congressional attempt “to come up with a politically and
substantively sensible policy solution to a complex problem,” but seeming to concede that this
example illustrates that constitutionality is only one consideration for members of Congress
and that other competing considerations sometimes prevail).
332. J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS 8-9, 133-45
(2004).
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with legislators, congressional staff, and others involved in the
legislative process, Pickerill concludes that “[p]olitics and policy
dominate congressional decision making, and members of Congress
do not systematically consider the constitutional authority for their
actions.”333 As one Senator ranked the considerations in the con-
gressional legislative process, “[p]olicy issues first, how [to] get a
consensus to pass the bill, six other things, then constitutional-
ity.”334
In sum, ethical and noninstrumental motivations to follow rules
surely play some part in the legislative process, especially with
regard to constitutional rules. However, it is unlikely that such
motivations will prevail whenever strong incentives to violate rules
exist. 
H. Summary 
The following table briefly summarizes the insights gained from
analysis in Part III of the political safeguards that potentially
impact congressional compliance with the rules that constrain the
legislative process.
333. Id. at 144.
334. Id. at 134.
2010] LAWMAKERS AS LAWBREAKERS 863
Safeguards Projected Impact on Procedural 
Rule Following
A. Electoral Controls Very weak impact.
B. Interest Groups Good-government groups are unlikely to
have an impact; rent-seeking interest groups
create incentive to violate rules in order to
insert special-interest provisions into legisla-
tion.
C. Policy Motivations Very strong impact. Creates strong incentive
to violate rules that hinder passage of legisla-
tors’ policy.
D. Party and Leaders Very strong impact. Creates strong incentive
to violate rules that impede the majority
party’s policy and political interests (as well
as strong incentive to enforce rules that




Weak impact on procedural rule following
(may be slightly stronger when divided gov-
ernment). Applies only to rules that impli-
cate institutional rivalry.
F. Presidential Veto Unlikely to induce procedural rule following.
Creates incentive to violate rules in order to




Weak to medium impact. Creates some in-
centive to follow rules, particularly constitu-
tional rules (and perhaps other internalized,
time-honored rules, such as filibuster).
As the table illustrates, the most influential forces on Congress’s
compliance with the rules that regulate lawmaking are legislators’
policy motivations and the majority party and its leaders. Although
these forces’ effects do not completely overlap, the combination of
the two creates a very strong incentive to violate lawmaking rules
that impede the majority party’s ability to pass its policy agenda.
Electoral controls and good-government groups are expected to have
little to no impact on procedural rule following, while special
interest groups create an incentive to violate the rules. Institutional
interests and institutional rivalry are also expected to have
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relatively little influence on procedural rule following. Furthermore,
institutional interests influence only those rules that implicate
institutional rivalry, such as bicameralism and the Origination
Clause. The threat of a presidential veto is also expected to have a
limited impact and may in fact motivate rule violations. The only
real safeguard that may induce rule following is legislators’ ethical
and noninstrumental motivations. Such motivations are expected to
have some positive impact on rule following, particularly on
constitutional rules, but it is doubtful that they can counterbalance
strong policy and partisan interests.
Hence, the overall impact of the “political safeguards” is in fact to
induce violations of the procedural rules that constrain lawmaking.
Nevertheless, this Article does not argue that lawmaking rules will
never be followed in Congress. Rather, as Part IV briefly explains,
Congress’s enforcement of these rules depends both on the rule in
question and on the circumstances.
IV. WHEN WILL LAWMAKERS BE LAWBREAKERS?
Part IV draws on the insights from the previous Parts to offer
some brief tentative observations about the types of lawmaking
rules that are more susceptible to violations, the circumstances in
which violations are more likely, and the incidence of violations.
A. Which Rules Are More Susceptible to Violation?
The likelihood of rule violations depends, to a large extent, on the
rule in question. This Article focuses on rules that impose proce-
dural restrictions on the legislative process.335 Accordingly, its
analysis of the political safeguards that impact congressional rule
following is tailored to this category of lawmaking rules. It is
important to recognize, however, that the same safeguards may
operate differently with regard to other types of congressional rules.
For example, legislators’ policy motivations and the majority
party’s interests are chief forces that induce lawmakers to be
lawbreakers of the lawmaking rules discussed by this Article.336
335. See supra Part I.A.
336. See supra Parts II, III.C, III.D, III.H.
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However, these same powers are likely to lead to relatively strong
enforcement of other types of rules, such as “fast track” rules, which
are statutory rules that are intentionally designed to expedite the
legislative process and to curtail the minority party’s ability to
obstruct the passage of legislation.337 The same is true for special
rules that are intentionally written by the House Rules Committee
to facilitate the majority party’s ability to pass legislation and to
protect party interests.338
Even within the subgroup of lawmaking rules discussed in this
Article, some rules are probably more vulnerable to violation than
others. To be sure, all the rules in this group hinder the majority
party’s ability to pass its policy agenda and therefore are susceptible
to violation, but the extent to which they hamper the majority
party’s agenda varies from rule to rule. The above analysis suggests
that this difference should have an important impact on the
likelihood of violation, since the dominant forces that motivate
violations of these rules are legislators’ policy motivations and the
majority party’s interests.339 
The degree to which the rule obstructs the majority party’s ability
to pursue its agenda is not the sole determinant of the likelihood of
violations, however. For example, as the discussion about non-
instrumental, rule-following motivations suggests, some rules, such
as constitutional rules and the Senate rules for ending debate, are
more internalized and revered than others and may therefore be
less vulnerable.340 The discussion of institutional interests also
suggests that rules that implicate one chamber’s prerogatives vis-à-
vis the other chamber, bicameralism and the Origination Clause,
may be slightly less susceptible to violation than rules that do not
involve inter-chamber rivalry—including three-reading, quorum and
voting, and amendment rules.341 In short, the vulnerability of a
certain rule to violation depends on the specific way in which each
337. On fast track rules, see Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules, supra note 18, at 345-
48, 358-60; Garrett, Purposes of Framework Legislation, supra note 18, at 727-28, 748.
338. Perhaps the most important example is restrictive rules that shield the bill from floor
amendments. On restrictive rules, see, for example, Owens & Wrighton, supra note 225, at
1-5.
339. See supra Parts II, III.C, III.D, III.H.
340. See supra Part III.G.
341. See supra Part III.E.
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of the safeguards relates to that rule, and on the overall combined
effect of these safeguards with regard to that particular rule.342
This conclusion fits nicely with a larger point in recent political
science research about institutional change in Congress: congres-
sional behavior is not determined by a single motivating force, such
as reelection motivations or party interests, but rather, by a com-
bination of potentially conflicting forces, whose overall impact varies
across areas of congressional activity.343 This point does not
undercut this Article’s general claim that the overall impact of the
political safeguards is a motivation to violate rules that set proce-
dural restrictions on the legislative process. Rather, it suggests that
although much of this Article’s analysis and many of its claims can
contribute to discussions about other types of rules and other areas
of congressional activity, each area requires individualized analysis
that will examine how the safeguards discussed in this Article
operate in that specific context. 
B. When Are Violations More Likely?
Some of the circumstances that impact the likelihood of violations
are case-specific, but this Article’s analysis does provide some
insights as to the type of bills that are more likely to produce rule
violations, the type of violations that are more likely, and more
general circumstances that impact the likelihood of violations.
Perhaps the most influential circumstances are the extent to
which the bill’s passage is a priority for the majority party and its
leaders, and the strength of the opposition that the majority party
faces in passing the bill. As the discussion of the DRA and Medicare
Bill examples illustrated, when the bill is particularly important for
the majority party, and its passage would be particularly difficult or
impossible without breaking the rules, the probability of violations
is, of course, much higher.344
342. It is possible, for example, that the filibuster procedure is relatively resilient despite
its clear negative impact on the majority party’s ability to pursue its policy agenda due to a
rare combination of other safeguards, such as the fact that it is relatively internalized and
revered; that it is the most important rule for the minority party, which has more power in
the Senate than in the House; and—perhaps most importantly—that more than any other
rule it serves each Senator’s individual goal of personal power and influence. 
343. SCHICKLER, supra note 127, at 4-5; Evans, Politics, supra note 127, at 493-94, 515.
344. See supra Part III.D.
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Furthermore, the likelihood of violations also depends on the
means or types of violation. Some violations can be easily carried
out by an individual legislator, committee chair, or chamber leader
without the need for other legislators’ collaboration;345 whereas
other violations may require the cooperation, or at least acquies-
cence, of a large group of legislators and are therefore harder to
accomplish.346 Similarly, violations that occur in the final stages of
the legislative process, and especially in the enrollment stage, are
likely to be more successful simply because they occur after the
stage that most enforcement—points of order or refusal to pass the
bill—can take place.
Some features of the legislative process can also influence the
likelihood of violations. For example, as the Farm Bill illustrated,
omnibus legislation makes violations, deliberate or unintentional,
more likely.347 Generally, as Congress’s use of unorthodox legislative
practices such as omnibus legislation increases, its capacity to avoid
procedural violations diminishes.348 While the normative debate
about the advantages and disadvantages of omnibus legislation is
beyond the scope of this Article,349 this conclusion contributes to the
debate by revealing an additional cost of this legislative device.
Finally, the likelihood of violations depends on the degree of
partisan and ideological polarization.350 As long as the intense
partisanship and ideological polarization in Congress, and especially
in the House, persist, rule violations and procedural abuses are
likely to be prevalent.
345. An individual legislator slipping a substantive rider into an omnibus appropriation
bill at the last minute is a good example. See, e.g., Goldfeld, supra note 196, at 368 & n.4, 369;
Bolstad, supra note 196.
346. See Bach, supra note 3, at 756; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, When Do
Rules of Procedure Matter?, 46 J. POL. 206, 208-20 (1984) (arguing that “procedures will prove
more binding and less susceptible to evasion when the costs of negotiating, policing, and
enforcing agreements to circumvent procedural restrictions are high”).
347. See supra Part II.B.
348. Id.
349. See generally GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 135-42 (2001); MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 170-75.
350. See supra Parts III.C, III.D.
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C. The Incidence of Violations
In the absence of systematic and current empirical data,351 it is
admittedly difficult to assess how often Congress violates the rules
in practice. Nevertheless, several rough observations in descriptive
congressional scholarship suggest that there were indeed numerous
cases in which Congress, especially the House, flagrantly ignored
lawmaking rules in recent years.352 
This descriptive scholarship indicates, moreover, that the two
houses “do not enforce all their rules with the same rigor [or] abide
by them with the same consistency”:353 some rules are apparently
351. There is at least one earlier study about Senate compliance with its legislative rules,
but that study examined a much earlier era (1965-1986) and rested on debatable proxies—the
frequency with which the Senate decided questions of order, and the frequency with which it
upheld points of order and sustained rulings of the Chair—as indications of compliance with
the rules. See Stanley Bach, The Senate’s Compliance with Its Legislative Rules: The Appeal
of Order, 18 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 77-78 (1991) [hereinafter Bach, Senate’s Compliance].
352. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 89, at 25 (claiming that the Republican-controlled Congress
between 1994 and 2006 “has demonstrated a conspicuous inability, unwillingness, or
incompetence to operate according to ‘regular order’—which means by long-established
traditions, norms, rules, and laws—not to mention the Constitution itself”); MANN &
ORNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 7 (arguing that procedures guaranteeing adequate time for
discussion, debate, and votes are “routinely ignored to advance the majority agenda”); Edward
R. Becker, Of Laws and Sausages: There is a Crying Need for a Better Process in the Way
Congress Makes Laws, 87 JUDICATURE 7-9 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he bottom line is that the
formal Rules of the House of Representatives are extensive and detailed, but the key rules are
all too frequently ignored in practice,” and providing several examples of rule violations);
Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto, supra note 127, at 473-74 (arguing that “Congress has
on numerous occasions decided not to follow statutized rules” and sometimes simply flouted
these rules); see also Grossman, supra note 196, at 262-70 (describing violations of rules that
govern conference committees); Zellmer, supra note 302, at 486-99 (describing deviations from
rules that prohibit substantive legislation through appropriations bills); David Heath &
Christine Willmsen, Congress Hides $3.5B in Earmarks, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008265781_apwaearmarkreform.html
(arguing that “time after time, Congress exploited loopholes or violated [earmark disclosure]
rules,” finding over 110 violations in a single bill). But cf. Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s
Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 387-88, 396-
97 (2009) (conceding that there is “some truth” to Mann and Ornstein’s claim that “the
majority flagrantly manipulates the rules for a partisan advantage,” while arguing that
“[a]ctually, the House in the 110th Congress was fairly good about abiding by rules designed
to give members some time to examine legislation before they were required to vote, but the
rules and abidance by the rules could be even stricter”). 
353. Bach, supra note 3, at 747; see also Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto, supra note
127, at 473-74 (arguing that Congress’s record of compliance with statutory procedural rules
“presents a distinctly mixed bag”).
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routinely ignored, while other rules, such as “fast track” rules, seem
to exhibit “a strong record of compliance.”354
A review of this scholarship may also suggest that non-
constitutional rules are violated much more frequently than
constitutional rules. Although “Congress’s disregard of [INS v.
Chadha’s] teachings has been notorious,”355 this descriptive
scholarship provides very few examples of direct and intentional
violations of constitutional procedural rules.356 That is, if one
excludes the hundreds of legislative veto provisions that Congress
continued to enact after the Court ruled such provisions unconstitu-
tional in Chadha,357 and unintentional violations such as in the
Farm Bill example,358 examples of flagrant constitutional violations
such as in the DRA case seem to be harder to find. 
The above may suggest that this Article has slightly underesti-
mated the degree to which the constitutional procedural rules are
internalized and canonized in Congress. An alternative explanation,
however, is that direct violations of constitutional rules are harder
to find both because the Constitution places such sparse lawmaking
requirements on Congress and because even these few limitations
have been interpreted and implemented by Congress in creative
ways that provide much latitude—including, for example, an
artificial presumption that the constitutionally required quorum is
always present “unless and until the presumption is proven incor-
rect.”359 It is possible, therefore, that constitutional violations are
354. Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto, supra note 127, at 473-74.
355. Cass & Strauss, supra note 81, at 15.
356. Cf. DEAN, supra note 89, at 51 (claiming that the behavior of the Republican majority
in Congress between 1994 and 2006 was “far worse than merely breaking the rules of the
House (or Senate), for they also [had] no hesitation about cavalierly ignoring the
Constitution,” but providing few examples to support this claim).
357. See Cass & Strauss, supra note 81, at 23 (noting that Congress has included legislative
veto provisions in its legislation “numerous times” since Chadha); Neal Devins,
Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115 (1996) (“In the decade after Chadha, 1983-1993, well over 200
legislative vetoes have been enacted into law.”); Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto:
Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288 (1993) (“Notwithstanding the
mandate in Chadha, Congress continued to add legislative vetoes to bills and Presidents
Reagan and Bush continued to sign them into law. From the date of the Court’s decision in
Chadha to the end of the 102nd Congress on October 8, 1992, Congress enacted more than two
hundred new legislative vetoes.”).
358. See supra Part II.B.
359. Bach, supra note 3, at 727-30. 
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less common because the majority party can almost always get its
way by violating only nonconstitutional rules.360
This explanation seems to find support in the experiences of the
states, whose constitutions place much more procedural limits on
lawmaking,361 therefore resulting in many more examples of
constitutional violations. Indeed, several scholars have observed
that state “legislators often do not follow the legislative procedure
requirements of the state constitution, particularly where the
legislative proposal is controversial and the courts do not enforce
the constitutional restriction.”362 Some state courts have similarly
observed that the state legislature has shown “remarkably poor self-
discipline in policing itself,”363 and that violations of some constitu-
tional lawmaking requirements have “become a procedural regular-
ity.”364 The Supreme Court of Illinois has perhaps been the most
explicit in its conclusion that “the assumption that the General
Assembly would police itself and judicial review would not be
needed because violations of the constitutionally required proce-
dures would be rare” has been repeatedly refuted in practice.365
Although the applicability of state experiences to Congress is not
clear, these experiences at least suggest that the alternative
explanation—that direct violations of constitutional rules are harder
to find because the Constitution places few lawmaking requirements
on Congress—may be plausible.
In sum, to the extent that the above far-from-scientific observa-
tions provide any indication, this Article’s analysis seems to have
360. Cf. Bach, Senate’s Compliance, supra note 351, at 88 (suggesting that the reason for
the relative paucity of contested questions of order in the Senate is that “Senate procedures
have not been a serious obstacle to individualism. Its rules normally are not confining and
when they do pinch, it is not for very long.... Rarely do senators contend that existing
procedures do not give them enough latitude.”).
361. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
362. Id. at 800; see also Denning & Smith, supra note 15, at 1000 (arguing that “many state
legislatures have often seen fit to skirt the edges of their constitutional [lawmaking]
requirements, or to ignore them entirely” and that “[i]n the experience of the states,” the
presumption that legislatures will comply with procedural constitutional limitations “seems
to have been unwarranted”).
363. Geja’s Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 1992).
364. Id.; see also Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (Ill. 2003);
Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Ill. 1994); McGinley v. Madigan, 851 N.E.2d 709,
724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
365. Geja’s Cafe, 606 N.E.2d at 1221.
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promising explanatory power, at least with regard to noncon-
stitutional rules. Undeniably, there is a great need for much more
vigorous and systematic empirical research about congressional
compliance with the rules that govern lawmaking. Hopefully, this
Article may contribute to such future research by providing several
testable predictions for general empirical studies, as well as for case
studies.
CONCLUSION 
Hans Linde was correct in his observation that “[o]ther partici-
pants than courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, to insist
on legality in lawmaking.”366 Duty and opportunity, however, are not
enough. Congress’s capacity and incentives to enforce the law of
congressional lawmaking upon itself are lacking. 
This Article’s conclusions refute the widely held assumption that
political safeguards can obviate the need for judicial review, at least
in the procedural lawmaking rules context. This does not mean that
judicial enforcement of these rules is necessarily the proper solution.
The impact of judicial review on legislative rule-following behavior,
and the other costs and benefits of judicial oversight, remain to be
examined. The starting point for any such examination, however, is
the recognition that Congress cannot police itself.
366. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 243-44 (1976).
